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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND HEALTH
by
Darin Frank Ullman
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott J. Adams
This dissertation consists of three chapters. My first chapter examines the effect of
mandatory first time offender ignition interlock laws. Specifically, I use difference in difference
techniques to estimate the effect of the laws on alcohol related fatal accidents. I also discuss and
link behavioral models of deterrence and incapacitation to the results, so that finding can easily be
interpreted. Results of the study provide pivotal policy relevant information that are essential to
maximizing public health and reducing dangerous alcohol related crashes. In particular, results
show that states which adopt legislation that requires mandatory participation of first time
offenders in ignition interlock programs, at low blood alcohol levels, experience significant
reductions in alcohol related accidents.
The second chapter of my dissertation uses detailed vehicle specifications to analyze the
impact identifiable vehicle characteristics and technological progress has on fleet fuel economy by
vehicle type and class. Estimates are generated following a cobb-douglas framework and an
identification strategy of a widely cited American Economic Review (AER) paper developed by
Christopher Knittel in 2011. Results reveal that vehicle manufactures will have a difficult task
complying with the new footprint-based C.A.F.E. standards by changing identifiable vehicle
characteristics alone. I also find evidence that more stringent footprint-based standards may create
incentives for manufacturers to increase vehicle size to lower the burden of compliance.
ii

My final chapter, uniquely contributes to the literature on medical marijuana laws (MML)
by being the first paper to analyze the impact of MML on employee sickness absence. With
evolving MML and an increasing number of states with recreational marijuana laws it will be
important for economist to understand how these laws impact markets and in particular the labor
market. The paper lays the groundwork for future research in this area by Utilizing the Current
Population Survey, the study identifies that absences due to sickness decline following the
legalization of medical marijuana. The effect is stronger in states with “lax” medical marijuana
regulations, for full-time workers, and for middle-aged males, which is the group most likely to
hold medical marijuana cards.

iii

This dissertation is dedicated to Mother, Father, Brothers, Sisters, and beautiful Fiancée.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Locked and not Loaded: First Time Offenders and State Ignition Interlock Programs .1
1.1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1
1.2. Conceptual Framework and Background..................................................................................4
1.2.1. Behavioral Model…………………………………………………………...............4
1.2.2. Basic Background…………………………………………………………………..5
1.3. Literature Review......................................................................................................................6
1.3.1. Literature on Ignition Interlocks……………………………………………………6
1.3.2. Literature on Other Policies Related to Drunk Driving…………………………….8
1.4. Data and Methods .....................................................................................................................9
1.4.1. Fatal Accident Data and State Ignition Interlock Laws………………………….....9
1.4.2. Methodology………………………………………………………………………11
1.5. Results .....................................................................................................................................14
1.5.1. State-Level Results………………………………………………………………..14
1.5.2. Discussion of Results……………………………………………………………...17
1.5.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis……………………………………………………………..19
1.5.4. Robustness Checks………………………………………………………………..20
1.5.5. California Case Study……………………………………………………………..23
1.6. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................26
References ......................................................................................................................................28
Chapter 2: A Difficult Road Ahead: Fleet Fuel Economy, Footprint Based CAFE Compliance,
and Manufacturer Incentives..........................................................................................................43
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................43
2.2. Data and Methodology............................................................................................................47
2.2.1. Data Source………………………………………………………………………..47
2.2.2. Methodology………………………………………………………………………48
2.3. Results .....................................................................................................................................51
2.3.1. Passenger Car and Light-Duty Truck……………………………………………..51
2.3.2. Class-Level………………………………………………………………………..53
2.3.3. Footprint Based Compliance Strategies…………………………………………...54
2.4. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................60
References ......................................................................................................................................62
v

Chapter 3: The Effect of Medical Marijuana on Sickness Absence ..............................................72
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................72
3.2. Data and Methods ...................................................................................................................73
3.3. Results .....................................................................................................................................75
3.4. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................76
References ......................................................................................................................................77
Curriculum Vitae ...........................................................................................................................80

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Pre-Treatment Graph ...................................................................................................37
Figure 1.2. Estimated Installed Interlocks and Alcohol-Impaired Driving Fatalities ....................42
Figure 1.3. Normalized Estimated Interlocks and Traffic Fatalities ..............................................42
Figure 1.4. Event Study .................................................................................................................42
Figure 2.1. Penetration of Fuel Improving Technologies ..............................................................64
Figure 2.2. Technological Progress by Vehicle Class ...................................................................65

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1. States with First Time Offender Ignition Interlock Laws and Effective Dates ............32
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics (means)..........................................................................................33
Table 1.3. Results for Drunk Drivers Median BAC ......................................................................34
Table 1.4. Results for Positive Alcohol Drivers Median BAC ......................................................35
Table 1.5. Timing of Effects (Median BAC) .................................................................................36
Table 1.6. Additional Estimates with Robustness Checks .............................................................38
Table 1.7. Results for California Case Study, Accidents involving a Drunk Drivers and Positive
Alcohol Drivers ..............................................................................................................................39
Table 1.8. Total Traffic Fatalities and Ignition Inter-lock Laws ...................................................40
Table 2.1. Vehicle Classes .............................................................................................................66
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks ........................................67
Table 2.3. Estimates of Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks ...................................................68
Table 2.4. Model 3 Estimates by Vehicle Class ............................................................................69
Table 2.5. Summary Statistics by Vehicle Class ...........................................................................70
.
Table 2.6. Class Compliance and Footprint Increase Incentive.....................................................71
Table 3.1. Effect of MML on Sickness Absence ...........................................................................79

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to everyone who supported me throughout my
graduate school career. In particular, I would like to thank my advisor Scott J. Adams for knowing
when to help me and when not to. I could not have completed my dissertation without your
guidance. You are one of the most intelligent, yet down to earth individuals I have met and that
says a lot compared to most economist. I would also like to thank John Heywood, for always
having an open door and helping me become a well-rounded researcher. Thank you as well to
Chad Cotti for providing me direction throughout my under-grad and graduate career. I would
also like to convey my appreciation to the additional members of my dissertation committee:
Professors Matt McGinty, Owen Thompson, and Scott Drewianka for their thoughtful and helpful
criticism, and support. Finally, I cannot forget to thank my family, friends, and beautiful fiancée
(Nicole), for putting up with me and providing the mental and emotional support needed to obtain
a PhD.

ix

1 Locked and not Loaded: First Time Offenders and State Ignition
Interlock Programs
1.1. Introduction
Accidents involving drunk drivers impose enormous social and economic costs on society.
The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that in 2012, 10,322
people died in drunk driving crashes and an additional 290,000 individuals were injured.
Furthermore, they estimate that drunk driving costs the United States $199 billion every year and
90% of these costs occurred in crashes involving a drunk driver with a blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) of .08 or higher (Report No. DOT HS 812 013).1 Given the magnitude of these societal
and economic costs, government officials are continuously enacting policies to prevent drunk
driving and the all too common fatal motor vehicle crashes that follow.
One such policy designed to prevent drunk driving is the ignition interlock program. The
ignition interlock device (IID) is designed to prevent vehicle operation when the driver is impaired
from alcohol consumption. Drivers are required to provide a breath specimen to the device before
it will allow the operator to start the vehicles’ engine. Legislation to support the use of the device
began in the late 1980’s. Improvements made to the device in the early 1990’s led to the adoption
of the program by counties and states across the country.2 Currently, numerous states have also
implemented the program to include mandatory participation by first time drunk driving offenders,
a group that the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has found to have driven drunk more than 80
times before being caught.

1

The estimated $199 billion costs include societal costs such as “lost quality of life”. Pure economic costs are equal
to $59 billion in 2010 for alcohol involved accident. Costs are expressed in 2010 dollars
2
Second generation IID improvements help prevent falsified tests. New features include: hum tone recognition,
filtered air detection, blow abort, and random running tests (Collier DW. 1994).
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Previous research has highlighted the effectiveness of the IID technology. In particular, a
recent meta-analysis has shown that the risk of recidivism for DWIs can be reduced up to 64
percent (Willis et al. 2004). Other research has highlighted the lack of success of comparable
drunk driving preventative policies, such as license suspensions. For instance, studies show that
50 to 75 percent of convicted drunk drivers whose license has been suspend continue to drive.
(Peck R.C. et al. 1995 and Beck K.H. et al. 1999).
This paper advances the literature on drunk driving laws and ignition interlocks in several
important ways. To begin, it is the first to apply difference in difference estimation methods to
analyze the effectiveness of current state polices that require mandatory installation of IID’s for
first time drunk driving offenders. Though this framework has become standard in policy
evaluation, the identification strategy controls for unobservable cross state heterogeneity, in
alcohol related behaviors, which can lead to biased estimates in traffic fatalities (Dee 1999).
Additionally, given what we know from prior research on ignition interlocks and the failures of
other drunk driving laws to prevent the behavior, this paper provides critical estimates of the
magnitude and effect of mandatory ignition interlock laws, which directly incapacitates offenders
from potentially fatal future drunk driving decisions.
Another contribution of the study is that is it provides suggestive evidence that
incapacitation is the primary reason for the estimated effect, rather than the deterrence. Finally,
the study provides pivotal public policy information for current and future legislation.
Specifically, the results from the study uncover that states that adopt “strong” (i.e., applied to
drivers convicted of having BAC .08 or greater) mandatory IID installation for first time offenders
experience a significant reduction in the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver. This
result is also negative and significant when considering the number of fatal accidents involving
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drivers with positive alcohol levels. However, results for states that adopt “weak” (i.e., only for
drivers with BAC .15 or greater) mandatory IID installation for first time offenders show no
significant effect in decreasing the number of fatal accidents with alcohol involvement.
In detail, the preferred estimates on strong IID adoption indicate that fatal accidents
involving a drunk driver decrease by 9% and fatal accidents involving a driver with a positive
alcohol level decrease by nearly 7%. In terms of fatal accidents cause by a drunk driver, this is
potentially equivalent to 1.4 fewer fatal accidents a month for a typical state. Focusing on the
reduction in fatal accidents from drunk drivers alone and considering that the NHTSA estimates
that the economic cost of a fatal accident is approximately $1,650,000, the national adoption of
strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders could potentially save $1.39 billion dollars.
If we instead consider the Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines for the value of
statistical life (VSL) which is equal to $9,100,000, then the total saving from the saved lives of
non-drivers alone is equal to $2.95 billion dollars in a year.
These results are robust to alternative models with varying controls, including state and
time fixed effects, state-time trends, population changes, economic climate, demographic
characteristics, other drunk driving polices, and taxes related to gasoline and beer. Additionally,
California’s pilot program provides an excellent case study at the county-level to analyze the
effectiveness of strong mandatory first time offender ignition interlock programs. These withinstate results do not suffer from the potential heterogeneity that sometimes plagues cross-state
analyses. The results are again robust and support the findings at the state level.
Overall, given the finding in this paper it is prudent for policy makers to take into
consideration the effectiveness of strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders in
preventing fatalities as a result of alcohol involved accidents. With 14 states that currently have
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weak ignition interlock laws for first time offenders and 11 states who still have no mandatory
policy for using the IID for first time offenders, this study provides essential information in
designing lifesaving public policy related to drunk driving.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays the ground work for the
underlying behavioral models and provides a brief background on ignition interlock laws. Section
3 discusses the related literature. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 5 explores
the empirical results at the state level, discusses the results, briefly describes cost benefit analysis
of the IID, provides robustness tests using an alternative BAC measure, different dependent
variables, as well as presents the California case study. Section 6 concludes.

1.2. Conceptual Framework and Background
1.2.1. Behavioral Model
The vast majority of economic studies related to drunk driving explicitly or implicitly adopt
the framework of Becker’s (1968) expected utility model of criminal behavior. The model and
associated literature propose that individuals are deterred from illegal actions when the associated
costs outweigh the benefits. Evidence of deterrence in the drunk driving literature is inconclusive.
As shown by Benson et al. (1999), deterrence alone has little effect on drunk driving without high
probability of police involvement.
In addition to deterrence theory, others such as Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell
(2007), have modeled optimal crime prevention through incapacitation.

Overall, when

incapacitation is the goal, the length and number of individuals incapacitated increases with time,
as long as the cost of incapacitating those individuals is less than the cost of the potential harm
they could create. Recent work by Miceli (2010, 2012) has also adapted the standard economic
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model for crime to include both deterrence and incapacitation theory. The unified model presents
an optimal decision that either increases the level of incapacitation if the deterrence level is low or
decreases the level of incapacitation if deterrence level is high.
In regards to mandatory ignition interlock laws, there is potential for both deterrence and
incapacitation to influence individual behavior that yields the result estimated in this paper. For
instance, individuals may be deterred from drinking and driving because they fear potential
negative social interactions.

Mandatory device installation could bring about unwanted

interactions with family, friends, and co-workers that reveal the offender’s prior illegal activity.
On the other hand, given that the device directly incapacitates individuals from operating their
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the more participants and greater probability of
installment, means lower BAC levels on the roadways and reduced likelihood of drunk driving
fatalities.
A reduction in fatal accidents itself is consistent with both the incapacitation and deterrence
models. However, I will engage in a number of tests that will be suggest the incapacitation model
is more reasonable in the case of IIDs.3 In short, we would expect incapacitation to be stronger as
the number of individuals affected by the law likely increases. So, if the effects grows over time
or the effect is stronger in locations where more individuals are expected to be incapacitated, then
this supports the behavioral model of incapacitation more than deterrence.

1.2.2. Basic Background

3

An event study, Figure 1.4., also suggests incapacitation, as there is a distinct lagged divergence in the trend of the
drunk accident rate for the strong IID states versus the control states. The lack of an immediate divergence in the
trend likely results because it takes time for offenders to be convicted and have a device installed. For instance,
some states do not require installment until after a 45-90 day suspension of license is served. Additionally, as time
increase the number of program participants increases, which magnifies the effect.

5

In this section I briefly provide additional specifics on state ignition interlock programs
and mandatory first time offender IID polices.4 Currently, all states have ignition interlock laws.
However, until recently those laws did not included mandatory participation among first time
offenders. Mainly they were used for repeat offenders.
Mandatory first time offender programs have been enacted in states in two forms: 1)
interlock requirement starts on conviction with BAC of 0.08 or greater and 2) interlock
requirement starts on conviction with BAC of 0.15 or greater.5 Although there is some small
variations in the length of time, generally convicted first time offenders are required to have the
device installed in their vehicle for a minimum of five months, but the length can exceed one year.6
Another difference in state interlock programs is how they are administered, which according to
the NHTSA can be grouped into three categories.7 Specifically, they are “administrative,” which
is overseen by a department of motor vehicles or similar agency, “judicial,” which is mandated by
the court system, and “hybrid” programs, which utilizes aspects of both of the prior mentioned
groups. Currently, states with first time offender programs are evenly split between each type.

1.3. Related Literature
1.3.1. Literature on Ignition Interlocks
A thorough review of the literature assessing the effectiveness of ignition interlocks was
recently conducted by Elder et al. (2011), with a consensus of studies showing drivers with

4

I refrain from dedicating a large portion of the text to IID specifics because detailed documents are easily
available. For instance, the NHTSA and MADD are heavy supporters of ignition interlock laws and both provide
comprehensive specifics of the laws and programs, which can be found on their websites. See:
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/IgnitionInterlocks_811883.pdf
5
Three states have higher BAC limits for the weaker first time offender IID program. Minnesota (BAC=.16),
Michigan (BAC=.17), and Nevada (BAC=.18). They are included in the “weak” IID policy group.
6
Summarized details of required installment length can be found here:
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-ignition-interlock-laws.aspx
7
See DOT HS 811 8883 for details.
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interlocks installed are at substantially less risk for recidivism. Additionally, the review evaluated
studies on the effect of ignition interlocks on motor vehicle crashes and driving, but just three
studies were available for review and only two were deemed reliable. The results of these studies
suggested that in comparison to a group of individuals who were subject to suspended licenses,
the ignition interlock group was found to have a higher crash risk. This could be due to the fact
that the IID group was also found to drive greater distances. Also noted was that some studies
found evidence that interlocks protected against alcohol-related crashes. Additionally, in a study
not included in the review by Lahausse et al. (2009), found that installing interlocks in all newly
registered vehicles, in Australia, could reduce traffic fatalities up to 24% a year.
Overall, the authors of the review are hesitant to draw any strong conclusions on the effect
of ignition interlocks on motor vehicle crashes given the limited number of studies. One major
conclusion of the review however, is that the success of ignition interlock programs is determined
by who participates and how it is implemented. In particular, the authors’ posit that mandatory
participation for first time offenders would likely be a major boost to overall public safety, and the
program should not be used for just repeat or high BAC offenders.
Finally, the NHTSA has developed several reports related to ignition interlock programs,
an example being “Ignition Interlock Institutes: Promoting the Use of Interlocks and
Improvements to Interlock Programs” (2013). Much of the reports focus on the IID research
developed by Richard Roth.8 Primarily, Roth’s research evaluates the effectiveness of New
Mexico’s interlock program. The studies find that the program has led to a substantial decrease in
interlock users’ recidivism rates as well as a 28% decrease in the number of DWI fatalities from
2005 to 2008 after the program moved to include first time offenders.

8

Research available at http://www.rothinterlock.org/welcome.htm.

7

1.3.2. Literature on Other Policies Related to Drunk Driving
The literature on the effect drunk driving policies have on fatal traffic crashes is vast.
Several previous publications, for instance Eisenberg (2003), have detailed literature reviews so I
refrain from providing anything but the highlights of the papers most applicable to my approach.
In particular, several studies examine the effectiveness of BAC limit laws. Dee (2001) uses an
OLS fixed effects model and finds that .08 BAC regulations reduce the fatal traffic crash rate by
7.2%, and the .10 BAC limit laws reduces the rate by 5.3%. Eisenberg (2003) evaluates the effect
of states switching from a .10 to .08 BAC limit and finds that the fatal crash rates falls by 3.1%.
Conversely, Freeman (2007) and Grant (2010) show that the effect of switching from a .10 to .08
BAC level is limited and that there is a declining effect of BAC limit laws over time.
In addition to BAC limit laws, Eisenberg (2003) also examines several other drunk driving
policies, including zero tolerance, administrative license revocation, dram shop, open container,
mandatory jail sentence for first conviction, and preliminary breath test laws. The results of the
analysis fit into the already mixed and conflicting conclusions of the previous research on these
drunk driving polices, with dram shop laws being the only universally agreed upon effective
policy. Similarly, Dills (2010) finds that social host laws for minors has a significant negative
effect drunk fatal crash rates among young adults between 18-20.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several unique and important facets.
Specifically, it is the first to use a regression-identified specification to analyze the impact of
mandatory participation of first time offenders in state ignition interlock programs. Using panel
data and variations across states, as well as within, the study is able to identify a causal effect of
the program. Though endogenity of the policy variable is always a concern in such studies, this
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study includes controls for other polices enacted during the period and shows that the effect is
observed apart from underlying trends in fatalities. This lends support for the exogenity of the
policy variable and presents the dynamic effect of the policy on drunk, BAC ≥ .08, and positive
alcohol, BAC ≥ .01, fatal accidents. Furthermore, this study provided additional information for
policy makers that wish to implement the best possible programs to prevent deadly and costly
alcohol related vehicle crashes.

1.4. Data and methods
1.4.1. Fatal accident data and state ignition interlock laws
Data on fatal vehicle crashes are obtained through the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS) of the NHTSA. It serves as the main source of data to generate the primary variables of
interest. Two of which are the monthly number of fatal accidents in a state for which a driver’s
imputed BAC is greater or equal to .08 and the monthly number of fatal accidents in a state for
which a driver’s imputed BAC is greater or equal to .01. These two dependent variables indicate
the number of fatal accidents that occur at the hands of drunk drivers and fatal accidents that occur
with drivers that have positive alcohol levels. The imputation of driver BAC is necessary because
of rampant misreporting of actual BAC levels at crash scenes. Although federal law requires BAC
levels to be obtained for every fatal crash, this is often not done. The NHTSA developed a multiple
imputation procedure following suggestions by Rubin et al. (1998) that uses characteristic of
individual crashes, such as time of day, time of week, and position of the car, to predict and impute
a BAC level for cases in which this data are missing.9 Confirmation of the procedure’s accuracy
in predicting driver BAC can be seen in the NHTSA (2002) report, “Transitioning to Multiple

9

The presence of an IID device in a vehicle involved in a crash is not use in the imputation process.

9

Imputation.”10 In what follows I routinely use the median or mean of the imputed BAC values for
each driver.11
For this study, I link these counts of monthly state fatal accidents to state-level legislative
data on strong and weak mandatory installation of the IID for first time offenders. States that have
enacted mandatory installation for first time offenders between 2001 and 2012 are branded as
treatment states for one of the two treatment levels and are used to create the policy variables of
interest in the form of dummy variables. Information on dates and state coverage of ignition
interlock laws was obtained from Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).12 For clarity, Table
1.1. describes the first time offender ignition interlock laws and enactment dates for both types of
treated states.13
The preferred estimates exclude Washington DC because of its unique driving conditions,
as well as Alaska for its relatively small number of monthly fatal accidents. Additionally, Iowa
is considered to be a part of the weak treatment group because of its unique BAC level but is coded
properly to represent its lack of within state variation.14 California’s first time offender policy is
limited to the participation of four major counties—Los Angeles, Alameda, Sacramento, and
Tulare. However, given that these counties include some of California’s major metropolitan areas
and account for over 13 million of the states’ population, it is included in the treatment group.15

10
Ten imputed BAC values are reported for each driver in a fatal accident. The mean or median is used to
categorize each driver as drunk, positive alcohol, or no alcohol. Results are robust with both methods.
11
Coupling the fact that previous actual values of driver BAC’s have been misreported along with the recent report
by the NHTSA, which assures the accuracy of the imputation process, there should be no concern in using imputed
values to determine the counts of alcohol involved fatal accidents. Additionally, this practice has become very
common in the drunk driving literature (Cumming et al. 2006; Adams et al. 2008; Romano et al. 2008; Williams et
al. 2012). In order to ensure that IID laws are not affecting predictors of BAC, I also estimated results using
previous techniques of drunk driving related research. Specifically, I regressed my models using only the times
when most alcohol related accidents are believed to occur, i.e.: nights and weekends. Results were consistent with
those found using imputed BACs.
12
See - http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/ignition-interlocks/status-of-state-ignition.html
13
Table 1.1. notes, lists states that enact first time offender IID policies after 2012.
14
Iowa’s mandatory policy has dictated that first time offenders with a BAC above .10 install the IID since 1995.
15
Results of various models are robust without the inclusion of California.
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The final data consist of 49 states, of which 12 are consider weak treatment states, 17 are strong
treatment states, and the remaining 20 state are controls. The data are evaluated over a 144 month
period for a total of 7056 observations.
Table 1.2. provides descriptive statistics, including means of the two treatment groups and
the control group used in analysis. The statistics show that there has been an overall decrease in
the raw number of fatal accidents involving drunk drivers in strong IID states, from 16.72 to 12.09
fatal accidents per month. Considering the changes in average population that occur for the preand post-treat strong IID group, I also look at the rate of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver
per 100,000 people, which in this case falls from .24 to .20. This reduction does not account for
downward trends that may be occurring over time for these types of accidents independent of the
IID policies, which necessitates the fixed effects research design described later. Estimates
discussed later in the paper provide evidence that the decrease is substantial and significant for
states that have adopted strong IID laws for first time offenders. A similar decrease in the number
of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels is also visible in the descriptive
statistics, of strong IID states from 20.39 to 14.69 per month. The rate per 100,000 people using
average population also falls from .29 to .245. This again proves to be a substantial and significant
decrease in the estimate results. Given that the number of fatal accidents is highly variable in
smaller states, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are weighted by the state-year population
size obtained from the Census Bureau.

1.4.2. Methodology
Individual numbers of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and fatal accidents involving
drivers with positive alcohol levels are first aggregated into state monthly totals. Those results are
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then pooled into the strong and weak states that have mandatory IID laws for first time offenders.
Remaining states that do not have either of these laws or do not change during 2001-2012 are then
pooled into the control group.

The basic analysis takes the form of a standard difference-in-

difference fixed effects model:

(1)

FAst = α + ηs + τt + µst + β1StrIIDst +β2WkIIDst + λ'Xst + εst ,

where subscripts s and t denote states and months. The terms ηs and τt are the state and month
fixed effects, respectively. To control for other factors that may impact the number of fatal
accidents over time, such as weather and construction, I include a complete set of state-time trends
unique to each state in some specifications. The state-time trend is the linear time trend “τ”
interacted with individual states “η”, that is “τ*η”, indicated above as µst. Even though including
comprehensive state-time trends in the model can often limit some identifying power, results prove
robust. StrIID and WkIID are the policy variables and indicate states that have a strong or weak
ignition interlock mandatory program for first time offenders. Thus, β1 and β2 are the primary
coefficients of interest.

As a reminder, strong states require participation if drivers are caught

under the influence of alcohol with a BAC of .08 or greater and weak states require participation
if the individuals BAC is .15 or greater.
FA is defined as the log (number of fatal accidents +1) involving a driver whose BAC is greater
or equal to .08. Alternatively, estimates are also performed where the dependent variable FA is
defined as the log (number of fatal accidents +1) involving a driver who has a BAC level of .01 or
greater, referred to earlier as a positive alcohol level. The log format was chosen to provide an
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easy interpretation of the effect of policy variables in terms of percentages.16

Log accident

estimates of equation (1) are weighted by state-year population. All estimate standard-errors are
corrected for correlation across states by means of clustering (Arellano 1987).
The X matrix contains a set of additional controls. I include controls for the log of the
population for each state, the proportion of males, the proportion of specific races, the median age
in each state, and real income per capita represent in 2012 dollars. The proportion of males is
included because males are more likely to be involved in fatal accidents.17 Other factors for which
I control that might be related to fatal accidents include the prevailing gasoline tax, beer tax, and
unemployment rate. Beer taxes for each state are included and represented in 2012 cents. State
unemployment rates, which were constructed from census data, are included because economic
volatility during the time period may have led to fewer drivers on the road (Cotti and Tefft 2011).
Finally, estimates also include controls for a selection of other relevant drunk driving policies
enacted during the sample period that could be correlated with IID policy variable of interest. For
instance, policy variables for .08 BAC limits (BAC08) and open container (OPEN) laws were
included, along with two polices directed at reducing underage drinking, which are license
suspension or revocation for underage purchase, possession, and consumption (UND21) and
liability for hosting underage drinking parties (PARTY). 18,19 Information and effective dates for
the above policy variables was obtained from the Alcohol Policy Information System of the
National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism.

16

Given the count nature of these dependent variables, for robustness and to ensure results are not driven by the
model choice, estimates were also preformed using an unweighted Poisson model. The results were consistent and
had no substantive effect on the conclusion of the analysis. Negative Binomial estimates were not used because this
model has been previously criticized as not being a true fixed effects estimator (Allsion et al. 2002)
17
See Washington State Department of Health (2012) for representative statistics.
18
An administrative license suspensions policy variable was not included because only one state (New York) in the
sample exhibited any variation of policy during the sample period.
19
Coefficients of these policies are omitted from results tables, as are many other controls, for brevity. Full
regression results for the various dependent variables are available in the appendix.
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In addition to estimating equation (1), I examine a similar model at the county-level using
California’s ignition interlock pilot program. The program has the same guidelines of mandatory
participation for first time offenders as the strong states described earlier, but there is no longer a
weak treatment group. Previous state-level controls such as gasoline tax and beer tax are no longer
included, and the state unemployment rate is replaced by county-level unemployment rate. State
and month fixed effects are now transformed to county and year fixed effects. Year fixed effects
replace months because there are numerous months in which several of California’s counties have
zero fatal accidents involving a drunk driver. Thus, the dependent variables for the number of
accidents involving a drunk driver and the number of accidents involving a driver with positive
alcohol levels are aggregated at the county-year level and include years 2007 through 2012. The
California case study results are intended to provide a robustness check on the effectiveness of
strong IID mandatory first time offender programs.

1.5. Results
1.5.1. State-level Results
I begin by estimating equation (1) at the state-level for both treatment groups and controls.
Table 1.3. provides the results for fatal accidents involving a drunk driver.20 Additionally, results
are provided without and with state-time trends and indicate the robustness of the identification
strategy. As indicated by the results, strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders, reduce
the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver by 9%. The result is significant at the 5
percent level, including state-time trends. The results also indicate the lack of effectiveness of

20

An accident is indicated as a drunk fatal accident if a drivers BAC is greater or equal to .08, using median imputed
BAC level of drivers.
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weak ignition interlock laws (i.e.: BAC ≥ .15) for first time offenders in reducing the number of
fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, as all estimates yield positive but insignificant results.
To consider the effectiveness of both strong and weak IID laws for first time offenders in
preventing fatal accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels, equation (1) is estimated
with the dependent variable now indicated as the number of fatal accidents with drivers who have
a BAC greater or equal to .01. The results for these estimates can be seen in Table 1.4. Again, it
is apparent that states with strong ignition nterlock laws for first time offenders are able to
substantially lower the number of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels.
For instance, results without and with controls for state-time trends, indicate that the number of
fatal accidents involving a driver with a positive alcohol level decreased by 9% and 7%. These
results are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level. With regard to weak IID states, the results once
again indicate that the more relaxed policy for drinking and driving for first time offenders does
not have a significant impact on lowering the number of fatal accidents involving a driver with
positive alcohol levels.
In all models for both drunk drivers (BAC ≥.08) and drivers with positive alcohol (BAC
≥.01) lead and lag effects were tested in regards to the policy variables (i.e.: strongIID and
weakIID). These results can be seen in Table 1.5., separated for regression by drunk, column (1),
and positive alcohol, column (2), and by weak and strong leads and lags. In all cases, no significant
results were found for leads. This supports the exogenity of the policy variables, as opposed to an
effect from a previously existing trend. It is also unlikely that the policies would have any effect
before enactment due to alcohol influenced drivers anticipating the enforcement of the law. A
pretreatment graph, Figure 1.1., displays the trend of the treatment groups and control group.
There are no differences in the trends. Additionally, the dynamic framework of Table 1.5., also
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provides additional insight on the impact of the strong IID policy. Results show that a greater and
more statistically significant impact prevails the longer the policy has been in place. This is not
surprising. As more offenders are prosecuted and the number of devices installed increases, the
more likely and stronger the potential impact of the policy, which further suggests incapacitation
as the dominant effect.21
It is worthwhile to convert the previously mentioned percentages into an actual number of
reduced fatal accidents involving drunk drivers. To do so, I focus my attention on the log accident
estimates that includes a full set of controls, along with a complete set of state-time trends. In
2012, the NHTSA reported that there were 9,364 fatal accidents resulting in 10,322 fatalities
involving a driver with a BAC .08 or higher (DOT HS 811 870, 2013). Using this information and
the estimation results, I find that the reduction in fatal accidents from strong ignition interlock laws
for first time offenders would be equal to 1.4 fewer fatal accidents involving a drunk driver for a
typical state in a typical month.22 We can also think about this in terms of saved lives. Using the
FARS data and estimation results, the 1.4 fewer fatal accidents involving a drunk driver would
approximately save 1.54 lives per state-month. Additionally, of the 10,322 reported fatalities
involving a driver with BAC .08 or higher, 6,688 were the drunk driver (DOT HS 812 032, 2013).
If we focus our concern to the lost lives of non-driver crash victims, then the 1.4 fewer fatal
accidents from strong IID laws for first time offenders would save approximately .54 non-driver
lives for a typical state in a typical month.23 Over an entire year, national adoption of strong
ignition interlock laws for first time offenders would save 324 innocent victims lives from drunk

21

When a quadratic state-time trend is added to the estimates of both drunk and positive alcohol models, the effect
of the IID policies are soaked up, suggesting a ramping of enforcement and incapacitation.
22
1.4 = (9,364*.09) / (12*50)
23
.54= (1.54 - (1.54*.648)); (6688/10322)=.648
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drivers.24

With

regard to fatal accidents involving a driver with a BAC .01 or higher, the NHTSA

reported that 10,918 such fatal accidents occurred in 2012, resulting in 12,041 fatalities (DOT HS
811 870, 2013). Following a similar process, using the estimated 7% reduction in fatal accidents
involving a driver with positive alcohol levels from having strong ignition interlock laws for first
time offenders, yields approximately 1.27 fewer fatal accidents involving a driver with positive
alcohol levels, for a typical state in a typical month.25 This reduced number of fatal accidents
involving a driver with positive alcohol levels could potentially save 1.41 lives per state-month,
of which .50 would be assumed to be the lives of non-drivers.26

1.5.2. Discussion of Results
It is useful to first assess the plausibility of results of this magnitude. In other words, is the
use of IID sufficiently large enough to account for up to a 9% reduction in fatalities among drunk
drivers?

To provide support for the plausibility, Figure 1.2. provides two side by side graphs.

One shows the estimated (in use) IIDs since 2005, the year in which states began to enact laws
requiring mandatory participation for first time offenders, until year 2013.27 The other shows the
number of alcohol impaired driving fatalities, where the drivers BAC level was .08 or higher.
Figure 1.3. plots both graphs together and normalizes the number of interlocks in use and number
of fatalities by their first year value. From the graphs, there appears to be a distinct correlation
between the increase in the number of interlocks and the decrease in the number drunk driving
fatalities. Furthermore, since the inclusion of first time offenders in the interlock program, the
number of estimated interlocks has increased by over 245%, whereas the number of fatalities has

24

324=.54*12*50
1.27 = (10,918)*.07 / (12*50)
26
.50= 1.41 - (1.41*.642)); (7730/12041)=.642
27
Data is limited to 2005 and after and was obtained from http://www.rothinterlock.org/welcome.htm.
25
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fallen by 25%. Also, the majority of interlock use can be linked to states that require mandatory
first offender participation. Specifically, in 2012 it was estimated that there were 280,000
interlocks in use, of which over 80% were in strong and weak first time offender law states, with
nearly 2/3 in strong states alone. Overall, these graphs provide evidence that the use of IIDs is
large enough to generate the results uncovered in this study.
Additionally, since California enacted its pilot program in 2010, the number of interlocks
installed for first time offenders for the four pilot counties went from about 2,348 to 43,574 by
2013, a nearly 1800% increase in IIDs for first time offenders (Chapman et al. 2015). This, along
with the density of the population and driving conditions in counties where the program was
installed, could explain why the effect in the case study is larger than the state level analysis. 28
In addition to understanding plausibility, it is important to policy makers to understand
whether it is deterrence or incapacitation that is underlying the results. There are a number of
reasons that suggest incapacitation. First, Figure 1.4. presents the average monthly drunk accident
rate for strong treated states. The accident rate is aligned by each state’s treatment date, where
negative values indicate pre-treatment and positive values indicate post-treatment.

For

comparison, the average weighted rate of drunk driving accidents is also presented for the control
states. While pre-treatment trends look similar, there is a distinct divergence in the trend compared
to the control states that begins approximately five months after the enactment. Since offenders
need to be caught and the devices installed, we would expect such a lagged effect. If deterrence
was indeed driving the results, we should see more immediate impacts.29 It is important to
recognize that the values in Figure 1.4. are not regression adjusted, which again necessitates the

28

For density of traffic in California treated areas, see California Department of Public Health website:
http://www.ehib.org/page.jsp?page_key=980.
29
Offenders generally have to serve a 45-90 day license suspension before a device can be installed.
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difference in difference methodology.

Overall, the figure does provide further support for

incapacitation.
Second, one would also expect that strong laws would have a greater incapacitation effect
than weak laws because it applies to a broader group of drivers and affects more offenders.
Specifically, the BAC limit of .08 is nearly half of the .15 BAC limit weak laws require. As a
result, strong laws create a greater probability of participation because a wider span of coverage
exists. This is supported by results. In strong states, where participation of offenders is more
likely, alcohol related accidents are significantly reduced. However, in weak states, where
participation is much less likely, there is no estimated effect on alcohol related accidents.
Additionally, dynamic timing of events results in Table 1.5., further exhibit the broader coverage
of strong laws. The results show that the magnitude and significance of the law increase as time
goes by, which is likely because of greater offender program involvement. All of this evidence
provides additional support for incapacitation.

1.5.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Vehicle crashes involving a drunk driver impose enormous social and economic cost on
society. In order to examine the cost-effectiveness of strong IID laws for first time offenders, I
compare the savings generated from preventing alcohol involved crashes and fatalities to the cost
of an interlock program. Since 90% of all costs occur in crashes involving a drunk driver with a
BAC of .08 or higher, I focus my cost-benefit analysis to this group alone.
In 2010, the NHTSA estimated that an alcohol involved fatal accident generates economic
costs of $1,650,000 in 2010 dollars. This total comes from a variety of potential costs, including
medical, insurance, legal, property damage, etc. all of which are magnified when the accident is
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fatal. Given that the prior estimation results, I can predict that the national adoption of this policy
could save up to 1.39 billion dollars in economic costs.30 Similarly, assuming that a lost life is
worth $9,100,000, (U.S. Department of Transportation 2013), then the non-driver lives saved by
strong IID laws for first time offenders would be approximately $2.95 billion. .31
In comparison, the cost of the ignition interlock program is fractional to the potential
savings just discussed. According to IgnitionInterlockDevice.org, the costs associated with the
device amounts to $50-200 installation fee and an additional monthly fee of $50-100. Overall, this
equates to about $2-4 per day over a year period, or roughly the cost of a drink at a bar. If we
aggregate these numbers to include the 280,000 reported in use devices by the NHTSA for 2012,
for all convicted drunk driving offenders, the total cost of installment is approximately between
$204 million to $409 million a year.32 This is about 7 to 14 percent of the total potential benefits
from the saved lives of non-drivers. More importantly, the offender is responsible for the cost of
the device, thus the potential benefits are realized by society but the cost is paid by the offender.
Additionally, according to incapacitation theory, a high level of incapacitation is ideal
when the cost to society, of the illegal activity, is large and the cost of incapacitation is small.
Thus, the approximated cost and benefit of the first time offender IID program discussed above,
suggests that incapacitation of offenders should be the goal of the program.

1.5.4. Robustness Checks
Although the previously estimated models are viewed as reasonable and able to identify
the impact of ignition interlock laws for first time offenders, it is important to recognize that there

30

$1.39 bill= (9364*.09)*$1,650,000
$2.95 billion = $9,100,000*324
32
See (Report No. DOT HS 811 815) for ignition interlock use data.
31
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are alternative ways to ways to measure individual BAC levels and different possible definitions
of the dependent variables. In order to verify the results are robust to alternative choices additional
estimates, of those alternatives are presented in this section. These robustness results are located
in Table 1.6. For comparison, the first panel repeats the Tables 1.3. and 1.4. policy variable results
from columns (2) and (3).
The first robustness check uses an alternative measure of individuals BAC level. Results
are in Panel A and use mean imputed values of driver BAC to identify the drunkest driver in an
accident and to categorize drivers as either drunk, BAC ≥ .08, or positive alcohol, BAC ≥ .01. The
change is made in order to see if the earlier choice of using median imputed BAC levels had any
impact on the results. The alternative mean BAC measure prove to be nearly identical in both
magnitude and significance level compared to the previous median BAC estimates. Results are
significant for both drunk and positive alcohol accidents at the 1% level without state-time trends
and at the 5 and 10 percent level for drunk drivers and positive alcohol when a state-time trend is
added. Additionally, the results using the alternative BAC measure consistently indicate that
strong IID laws for first time offenders substantially decrease the number of fatal accidents caused
by a drunk driver, by approximately 8%. Again, all results indicate weak IID laws have no
significant impact.
Next, I test for robustness of the dependent variable by estimating an alternative dependent
variable and two other definitions of the number alcohol-related fatal accidents. The first result in
Panel B changes the dependent variable to the log of the number of drivers who were drinking and
involved in a fatal accident. It is reasonable to believe that if IID laws for first time offenders
reduce the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver than it should also reduce the number
of drunk or positive alcohol drivers who took part in a fatal accident. The results indicate that
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states with strong IID laws for first time offenders significantly reduce the number of drunk drivers
by 11% and 10%, without and with state-time trends respectively. These results are significant at
the 1% and 5% level. However, results for states with weak IID laws indicate that the policy had
no significant impact on the number of drunk or positive alcohol drivers involved in a fatal
accident. Second, to test the sensitivity of the linear results using log accidents (instead of levels),
the number of alcohol-related fatal accidents as the measure for my dependent variable. The results
do not change the conclusion that states with strong IID laws significantly reduce the number of
fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and the number of fatal accidents involving drivers with
positive alcohol levels. Whereas states with weak IID laws for first time offenders do not
significantly reduce alcohol-related fatal accidents. I also define the dependent variable as the
number of alcohol-related fatal accidents per 100,000 state residents, which is a common form of
the dependent variable in previous fatal accident analysis literature. Once again, the results are
consistent and highly significant at the 1 and 5 percent level without and with state-time trends.33
In addition to the robust results discussed above, I also do some work to refine the control
group using propensity score analysis. These results are located in the appendix as Table 1a. After
matching treated states with the best available control states, results again indicate that policy
enactment for strong states led to a statistically significant reduction in both the number of drunk
and positive alcohol fatal accidents. Whereas the weak IID policy has not. A dependent variable
of the number of accidents involving a driver that is under 21 was also examined. This result can
be seen in the appendix in Table 2a. Again, the result of interlock program was negative and

33
The number of non-alcohol related accidents was used as a falsification exercise. Given that this is not the target
group of the interlock program it is reasonable to hypothesis that the dependent variable should yield no significant
results. With both mean and median BAC levels used to identify a driver as no alcohol, no significant effects of IID
polices on fatal accidents were found. Results can be seen in the appendix.
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significant at the 5 percent level, even with including state-time trends. Individuals under 21 are
also subject to installation of an IID under their first offense for alcohol involved driving.
However, part of the result could be driven by preventing those legal age drinkers who would have
chosen to drink and drive at night or on the weekends, from crashing into younger under
experienced drivers. For instance, the Insurance Institute of Highway safety found that in 2012,
49% of under 21 accidents occurred at night.
Finally, Table 1.8. reports the results of the first time offender IID polices impact on total
fatalities. Overall, the enactment of the strong interlock policy had a negative impact of 5% in
reducing total fatal accidents, which is significant at 1 percent level without state-time trends. This
result helps confirm the impact of the IID polices is likely the result of a reduction in fatal accidents
involving drivers under the influence of alcohol. When trends are added the result falls to a 3%
reduction in fatal accidents, and significant at the 10 percent level.

1.5.5. California Case Study
California enacted a pilot program on July 1, 2010 that is set to run through December 31,
2015, which requires first time offenders of drunk driving (i.e. BAC greater or equal to .08) to
install an IID in their vehicle. The program is limited to the participation of four counties
(Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Tulare), but the population totals of these counties
account for over one third of the states’ entire population or approximately 13 million people.
Additionally, any offender who is cited and convicted of a DUI in one of these four counties is
required to install and IID regardless of the offenders’ legal residence. Given the guidelines of
California’s ignition interlock pilot program, it provides an excellent case study to examine the
effectiveness of strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders at the county level. These
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within state estimates have the additional benefit of avoiding potential heterogeneity that cross
state estimates can sometimes suffer from. The estimation procedure again follows a fixed effects
model with a few subtle modifications, which are described in detail in the methodology section.
The results for the case study can be seen in Table 1.7., which includes estimates for accidents
involving drunk drivers and accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels.
These estimates indicate that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders
significantly reduce the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, as well as the number
of fatal accidents involving drivers with positive alcohol levels. Specifically, the log accident
model shows that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders reduce the number of fatal
accidents involving a drunk driver by about 25% in California. This result is significant at the 5
percent level. With regard to drivers who have positive alcohol levels, the results again indicated
that strong ignition interlock laws for first time offenders have a significant impact in reducing the
number of fatal accidents.

The estimates suggest that the policy reduced the number of fatal

accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels by 20%. This results is significant at the
5 percent level.
We can again think about these results in terms of an anticipated reduction in the actual
number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver and the anticipated reduction in the number of
fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels if California would have applied the
law to all counties. In 2012, California had 719 fatal accidents involving a driver with a BAC
greater or equal to .08, thus the strong IID policy for first time offenders would have the potential
to prevent 3 fatal accidents for a typical county in a typical year.34 Additionally, in 2012 California
had 842 fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels. Using the estimation results

34

3.09 = (719*.25) / 58; there are 58 counties in California.
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for this group would imply that statewide application of the strong ignition interlock pilot program
would have had the potential to prevent 2.90 fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol
levels for a typical county in a typical year.35
A previous report created by the California Department of Motor Vehicles in 2005 also
looked at the effects of ignition interlocks on first time offenders in the state. At the time of the
report the policy was not mandatory and only impacted first time offenders who were convicted
of drunk driving with a BAC of .2 or greater, thus is was a much weaker policy than the pilot
program. Using a Cox model, the report compared a treatment group of offenders who were
required to install an IID to a comparison group with similar traits who were not. The study
differed from mine in that its particular interest was examining whether there were lasting effects
of the IID policy that encouraged behavioral modifications of those convicted of drunk driving
and were required to use an IID. There were no differences between the treatment and comparison
group subsequent crash rates following IID use (DeYoung et al. 2004).
However, one could argue that this may be a result of the treatment and control groups
being an extreme group of drunk drivers that are unlikely to modify their behavior and results may
prove significant if the groups included first time offenders with BAC greater or equal to .08. For
instance, a study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, examined Washington’s first time
offender IID policy and found that first time offenders were dramatically affected by the policy
change as their two-year recidivism rate fell by 12% (McCartt et al. 2013). On another note, the
California DMV recently (2015), published a report on the deterrent effect of the pilot program on
drunk driving convictions and found no support of deterrence. The report did not examine the

35

2.90 = (842*.20)/ 58
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pilot programs impact on accidents but its results that show IID laws do not deter drunk driving
appear to be consistent with the ones found in this paper.
It is important to note that the California estimates in this paper suffer from a short post
treatment period, which questions whether the estimates size could be due to some unobservable
transitory effects. Nevertheless, the California result indicate consistency with the state level
results presented earlier. Additionally, whether or not strong IID laws for first time offenders
modify the behavior of the offender in the long run, it is evident from my California case study
and statewide results that the desired effect of reducing and preventing costly alcohol related
accidents is possible when strong IID polices for first time offenders are in place.

1.6. Conclusion
This paper uniquely applies difference in difference fixed effects estimation methods to
analyze the effectiveness of ignition interlock programs, at the county- and state-level in
preventing fatal alcohol involved crashes. Results indicate that the potential for interlock programs
to prevent alcohol involved driving and alcohol-related crashes is most significant when the
program is applied to a broader cross-section of offenders and a higher proportion of offenders
have the interlock device installed. Thus, states and counties that adopt strong IID programs,
which require mandatory participation by first time offenders convicted of driving under the
influence with a BAC of .08 or higher, see a significant and sizeable decrease in the number of
costly fatal accidents involving a drunk driver or a driver with positive alcohol levels.
Furthermore, these estimates are consistent across county- and state-level models, robust to an
alternative measures of individual BAC, and to several alternative definitions of the dependent
variable. Relatedly, results indicate that incapacitation of offenders is driving the estimated effect
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and individuals are not deterred by the laws alone. However, given the relatively low cost of
program implementation and high estimated benefits, theory suggests incapacitation should be the
goal of the program.
With current and future legislation activity yet to be determined on the inclusion of first
time offenders and level of participation by BAC, this paper provides evidence that allows states
to maximize public safety. The interlock program should be applied to first time offenders who
are not just high-BAC offenders. Additionally, the interlock program provides a low cost
solution, paid for by offenders, to a dangerous and often fatal activity that imposes large social
and economic costs on society. To maximize public health, states with weak IID laws or states
that currently have no interlock program which require mandatory participation for first time
offenders, should adopt strong IID programs to prevent future costly alcohol-related fatal
crashes.
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Table 1.1. States with First Time Offender Ignition Interlock Laws and Effective Dates
State
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California*
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Effective Date
January-2009
September-2007
April-2009
July-2010
January-2009
January-2012
October-2010
January-2011
January-2009
July-1995
July-2011
July-2007
October-2011
October-2010
July-2011
January-2009
July-2005
January-2010
June-2005
August-2010
December-2007
November-2011
January-2008
September-2005
July-2009
July-2012
January-2009
July-2008
July-2010
July-2009

Enforcement
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Weak
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Weak
Weak

Notes: States Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Tennessee enacted
Strong ignition interlock laws after 2012. States Rhode Island and Sound Carolina enacted Weak ignition
interlock laws after 2012. *Pilot Program: Los Angeles, Alameda, Sacramento, and Tulare (Counties)
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Table 1.2. Summary Statistics (means)
Pre-Treat
Post-Treat
(Strong)
(Strong)
Number of Fatal
16.72
12.09
Accidents BAC ≥ .08
Number of Fatal
20.39
14.64
Accidents BAC ≥.01
Population
7,025,690
5,983,977
Beer Tax (2012
.35
.33
Cents)
Real Gas Tax
.001
.001
Unemployment Rate
5.36
7.62
(monthly)
Percent Male
.495
.496
Real Inc. Per. Cap.
41,978
40,337
Median age
35.8
36.4
Percent White
.786
.802
Percent Black
.088
.081
Percent Asian
.063
.046
Other
.063
.071

Pre-Treat
(Weak)
22.49

Post-Treat
(Weak)
29.45

Control

27.29

35.97

18.99

7,477,607
.24

10,533,561
.28

5,519,973
.30

.001
5.39

.001
8.14

.001
5.65

.495
42,652
36.9
.806
.124
.032
.038

.497
42,048
36.9
.797
.123
.041
.039

.492
41,166
36.9
.809
.116
.034
.041

15.75

Note: Accident means are reported using median BAC counts. All estimates are weighted by state-year population.
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Table 1.3. Results for Drunk Drivers Median BAC

Strong
Weak

(1)
-.084**
(.0363)
.019
(.0404)

Population
Unemployment
Real Gas Tax
Percent Male
Real Income Per. Cap.
Median Age
Percent Black
Percent Asian
Percent Other
Beer Tax
Other DD Policies
State, Time F.E.
State-Time Trend
Observations

No
Yes
Yes
7056

(2)
-.104***
(.0258)
.033
(.0328)
.742**
(.2842)
-.078
(.0540)
.019
(.0187)
.045
(.0296)
1.030***
(.2677)
.374
(.7414)
-.025
(.0283)
-.011
(.0186)
.085**
(.0360)
-.002
(.0248)
Yes
Yes
No
7056

(3)
-.090**
(.0399)
.040
(.0376)
3.910***
(1.034)
-.061
(.0686)
-.004
(.0247)
.106***
(.0315)
.873***
(.3631)
.313
(1.099)
-.217***
(.0730)
-.001
(.2191)
-.003
(.2307)
-.055
(.0337)
Yes
Yes
Yes
7056

Notes: Reported results are from weighted least squares regressions, weighted by state-level
population for 49 states over 144 months. The dependent variable is the natural log of fatal
accidents + 1 involving a drunk driver, i.e. BAC≥ .08. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.4. Results for Positive Alcohol Drivers Median BAC

Strong
Weak

(1)
-.060*
(.0320)
.0167
(.0380)

Population
Unemployment
Real Gas Tax
Percent Male
Real Income Per. Cap.
Median Age
Percent Black
Percent Asian
Percent Other
Beer Tax
Other DD Policies
State, Time F.E.
State-Time Trend
Observations

No
Yes
Yes
7056

(2)
-087***
(.0252)
.036
(.0321)
.848***
(.2750)
-.067
(.0490)
.022
(.0235)
.421
(.0284)
1.210***
(.2947)
.495
(.7741)
-.040
(.0282)
-.010
(.0232)
.045
(.0434)
-.017
(.0278)
Yes
Yes
No
7056

(3)
-.068**
(.0333)
.039
(.0360)
4.115***
(.9859)
-.065
(.0628)
.004
(.0256)
.101***
(.0282)
.776**
(.3506)
.075
(1.034)
-.210***
(.0665)
-.010
(.2357)
-.033
(.1823)
-.069
(.0442)
Yes
Yes
Yes
7056

Notes: Reported results are from weighted least squares regressions, weighted by state-level
population for 49 states over 144 months. The dependent variable is the natural log of fatal
accidents + 1 involving a driver with positive alcohol levels, i.e. BAC≥ .01. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.5. Timing of Effects (Median BAC)

3 Months
Before
6 Months
Before
9 Months
Before
0-3 Months
After
3-9 Months
After
9-15 Months
After
15 + Months
After
Other DD Policies
Full Set of Controls
State, Time F.E.
State-Time Trend
p-value: joint test
leads (strong)
p-value: joint test
leads (weak)

(1)
Drunk Drivers BAC ≥.08
Strong
Weak
-.015
-.022
(.0513)
(.0908)
-.001
.005
(.0590)
(.0838)
.055
.048
(.0582)
(.0581)
-.062
.063
(.0425)
(.0533)
-.050
-033
(.0497)
(.0378)
-.078*
.035
(.0426)
(.0564)
-.084**
.021
(.0351)
(.0308)

(2)
Positive Alcohol BAC ≥.01
Strong
Weak
.007
-.007
(.0384)
(.0843)
-.015
-.012
(.0428)
(.0766)
.053
.010
(.0401)
(.0505)
-.056
.086
(.0432)
(.0640)
-.030
-.032
(.0472)
(.0332)
-.072*
.037
(.0415)
(.0504)
-.070**
.019
(.0347)
(.0299)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

.71

.60

.81

.98

Notes: (1) and (2) represent a separate weighted least squares regressions. The dependent variable
is the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver +1, i.e. BAC≥ .08 and the number of fatal
accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol +1, i.e. BAC≥ .01. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of observations from the same state.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 1.1. Pre-Treatment Graph
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Notes: The graph is a moving average of the number of fatal drunk driving accidents in a month,
where time period 80 corresponds to July, 2007. The graphs shows that the pre-treatment trends
for all groups are nearly identical. New Mexico and Nevada are not included in the averages
because they become treated in 2005. However, I chose the following because the pre-treatment
window falls right in the middle of my data (2001-2012) and most states, besides NM an NV, do
not begin to treat until after July, 2007. The shorter window with NM and NV included, also
exhibits the same pre-treatment trend between all of the groups.
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Table 1.6. Additional Estimates with Robustness Checks
Drunk Driver BAC ≥ .08
Positive Alcohol Driver BAC ≥ .01
Strong
-.104***
-.090**
-087***
-.068**
(.0258)
(.0399)
(.0252)
(.0333)
Weak
.033
.040
.036
.039
(.0328)
(.0376)
(.0321)
(.0360)
Panel A. Alternative BAC Measure:
Mean
Strong
-.094***
-.066**
-.079***
-.048*
(.0278)
(.0332)
(.0300)
(.0280)
Weak
.039
.034
.021
.041
(.0331)
(.0332)
(.0294)
(.0260)
Panel B. Alternative Dependent. Variables:
Log Number of Drinking Drivers Involved in Fatal Accident, (median BAC)
Strong
-.110***
-.098**
-.094***
-.079**
(.0264)
(.0411)
(.0263)
(.0350)
Weak
.034
.034
.036
.034
(.0352)
(.0412)
(.0341)
(.0387)
Number of Fatal accidents i.e., levels not logs, (median BAC)
Strong
-2.590**
-2.951**
-2.262*
-2.653*
(1.068)
(1.440)
(1.214)
(1.520)
Weak
1.401
-.619
2.582
-.317
(1.318)
(1.244)
(1.601)
(1.294)
Log Alcohol-related Accident Rate per 100,000 people, (median BAC)
Strong
-.115***
-.098**
-.094***
-.077**
(.0279)
(.0421)
(.0261)
(.0338)
Weak
.031
.039
.041
.043
(.0318)
(.0381)
(.0333)
(.0392)
Other DD Policies
Full Set of Controls
State, Time F.E.
State-Time Trend

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of
observations from the same state.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.7. Results for California Case Study, Accidents involving a Drunk Drivers and
Positive Alcohol Drivers

Strong
Population
Unemployment
Percent Black
Percent Asian
Percent Other
Percent Male
County- time F.E.
County-Time Trend
Observations

Log Accidents
BAC ≥ .08
BAC ≥ .01
-.257**
-.204**
(.1039)
(.1016)
10.946
7.555
(8.888)
(9.507)
.246
.2503
(.4649)
(.3918)
.855
.709
(.6049)
(.6126)
.065
.361
(.6113)
(.5994)
-.218
-.075
(.3002)
(.2590)
.184
.201
(.1856)
(.1698)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
348
348

Notes: Reported results are from regression for 58 total counties over 6 years. The dependent
variable(s) are the number of fatal accidents involving a drunk driver, i.e. BAC≥ .08 and the
number of fatal accidents involving a driver with positive alcohol levels, i.e. BAC≥ .01.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered to allow for nonindependence of
observations from the same county.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 1.8. Total Traffic Fatalities and Ignition Inter-lock Laws

Strong
Weak
Other DD Polices
State-, Time- F.E.
Controls
State-Time Trend
Observations

(1)
-.056**
(.0231)
.015
(.0139)

(2)
-.057***
(.0153)
.006
(.0215)

(3)
-.032*
(.0184)
.017
(.0243)

No
Yes
No
No
7056

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
7056

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
7056

Notes: Dependent variable is equal to the number of total fatalities. Standard errors, corrected
for correlation by means of clustering at the state level, are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 1.2. Estimated Installed Interlocks and Alcohol-Impaired Driving Fatalities
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Figure 1.3. Normalized Estimated Interlocks and Traffice Fatalities
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2 A Difficult Road Ahead: Fleet Fuel Economy, Footprint Based
CAFE Compliance, and Manufacturer Incentives
2.1. Introduction
The future of the vehicle fleet and its characteristics is in flux. Recent federal guidelines, finalized
by the Obama Administration and U.S. automakers, have been issued by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to raise Corporate Average
Fuel Economy standards, (CAFE), from the 35.5 mpg for 2016 model year vehicles, to 54.5 mpg
for 2025 model year vehicles. The increase has many wondering how vehicle manufacturers will
comply with the new standards and the impact it may have on vehicle characteristics.
CAFE standards, enacted in 1975 as a part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, have
been used to encourage progress in fleet vehicle fuel economy, but the recent mandate is the largest
change in the standards’ relatively short history. Estimates by the EPA, predict that the new
standards will reduce oil consumption in the United States by 4 billion barrels and reduce
greenhouse gases (GHG) by 2 billion metric tons over the lifetime of vehicles sold in model years
2017-2025 (EPA 2012).

Additional benefits of fuel standards include consumer savings from

reduced fuel expenditures and the creation of an estimated 570,000 new jobs throughout the U.S.
economy (The Blue Green Alliance 2012). However, all of these expected estimated benefits
would be overstated if manufacturers were to comply with standards through an alternative plan,
such as increasing vehicle sizes. Such a plan was not originally conceived, by policy makers, as a
possible compliance strategy for automakers, however it has the potential to undermine the
benefits and goals of the new footprint based CAFE program.
Since the first fuel economy target of 18 mpg for passenger cars by 1978, the fleet of vehicles
in the United States has been ever evolving in power, size, and weight. A rich and diverse
43

collection of research has been dedicated to CAFE standards and changing fleet characteristics,
including their impact on safety (Anderson and Auffhammer 2011; Jacobsen 2011, 2012), energy
policy (Greene 1998), technology (Knittel 2011), and sales (Thorpe 1997; Klier and Linn 2010),
as well as whether CAFE polices are effective (Clerides and Zachariadis 2006).
For this paper, two prior publications are most relevant for discussion. Knittel (2011) serves
as the starting point for this paper’s approach. He uses model-level data for vehicles in the U.S.
from 1980 to 2006 to determine compliance strategies for both Bush Administration model year
2020 CAFE standards and the more rigid Obama Administration 2016 model year CAFE
standards. Congruent with results found in this paper, his results suggest that above average
technological advances are needed for standard compliance. Additionally, for manufacturers to
reach fuel economy levels near or above 50 mpg, for passenger cars and light trucks, vehicle
characteristics would have to be unrealistically downsized to the vehicle power and curb weight
characteristics observed in 1980. The mix of vehicles in the fleet would also have to be primarily
passenger cars. Unlike Knittel, I estimate results by vehicle classes, as well as passenger cars and
light-duty trucks, which provides a more comprehensive story for compliance strategies to the new
footprint based standards.
Incorporating how vehicle footprint calculations might impact manufacturer compliance
strategies brings us to the second relevant publication of discussion. Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012)
look at whether manufacturers have any design incentive to increase the footprint of their vehicles
in production as opposed to changing vehicle characteristics and performance that may be more
in-line with consumer preferences. Using an oligopolistic-equilibrium model, they simulate the
change in the sales-weighted average of overall vehicle size with varying consumer preferences to
vehicle fuel economy, performance, and technology features. The results from simulations with
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different levels of price-elasticity of demand, suggest that manufacturers have an incentive to
increase vehicle size in all simulations except when consumer preference for vehicle size are at its
lowest bound. The authors conclude that the hypothesis that footprint-based CAFE standards do
not create incentives for manufacturers to increase vehicle size is rejected across a wide-range of
consumer preferences. In light of the results by Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012), I revisit the model
developed by Knittel to see whether manufacturers have an incentive to increase vehicle size to
lower the burden of compliance.
Specifically, I test how changes in vehicle weight, power, other vehicle specifications, and
annual technological progress impact fuel economy.

This study illustrates the difficulties

manufacturers will face if compliance is only obtainable through these identifiable vehicle
characteristics. In comparison to Knittel, I use more recent data and extend the analysis beyond
just passenger cars and light-duty trucks. This is an important consideration because the new
standards are footprint based, where smaller vehicles have relatively more stringent standards, and
larger vehicles have less stringent standards. Specifically, footprint calculations measure the
relative size of a vehicle and are derived by averaging the front and rear track width and
multiplying by the wheelbase of the vehicle.36 To incorporate footprint calculations, I stratify
estimates by vehicle class using vehicle classifications set by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and use average class footprints to determine designated compliance
levels.37
Over the 13 year span of data (2001 to 2013), I find that vehicle weight and technological
progress are major factors in determining fuel economy among all vehicle classes. Specifically, a

36

Footprint calculations: ftptit= (((ftrkit + rtrkit)/2)*whbsit )/144), which yields square feet
Table 2.1. provides a description of the ten vehicle classes. Full-size trucks do not include 2500 or 3500 models.
See http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809979.pdf.
37
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reduction in weight is most impactful in sub-compact and minivan classes, with a 10 percent
reduction in weight within these classes associated with a 7 percent increase in fuel economy.38
Remaining gains in fuel efficiency are the result of residual technological progress that comes
about apart from the most identifiable vehicle characteristics. My model identifies this residual
technological growth at 1.9 and 1.4 percent for passenger cars and light-duty trucks per year,
whereas average class results range from .5 to 2.1 percent.
The results suggest that manufacturers will face difficulties in complying with standards if
advances in technology continue at an average level and the only other compliance measures are
attempted through changing basic vehicle characteristics such as weight and power. Significant
additional technological progress beyond current rates of progress are needed for each class of
vehicles to reach compliance. Only two classes of vehicles (minivans and compact SUV) are able
to comply with the 2025 standards without experiencing the maximum estimated technological
growth.39
Despite the NHTSA belief, that the new footprint based standards are designed in such a
way that the standards do not encourage manufactures to increase vehicle footprints (NHTSA
2009), my estimates suggest manufactures have an incentive to increase vehicle footprints in order
to fall to a more conservative fuel economy level that is achievable with smaller changes to vehicle
weight, power, and is less dependent on technological advances. This incentive undermines the
standards potential to reduced oil consumption and reduced emission levels that would come from
the fuel efficient vehicles the program is designed to create.

38

A 10 percent reduction in weight increases fuel economy for passenger cars and light-duty trucks by 3 percent.
These results are slightly less than those found by Knittel (2011) of approx. 4 percent for vehicle data 1980 to 2006,
and may suggest manufacturers are finding less need to reduce weight in order to improve fuel economy
39
Maximum estimated technological progress is obtained from the difference between years of technological
progress estimates. By ordering these technology growths from smallest to largest I am also able to select the 75th
percentile.
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Alternatively, manufacturers may also have the incentive to take advantage of the CAFE
programs built in flexibilities which introduce credits and compliance multipliers that lower the
burden of compliance. For this paper, I do not model CAFE program flexibilities but incorporate
them into discussion as relevant manufacturer alternatives for potential compliance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology used for estimation. Section 3 explores the empirical results at the passenger car and
light-duty truck level, class-level, and results for compliance strategies incorporating footprint
measures. Section 4 concludes the paper.

2.2. Data and Methodology
2.2.1. Data Source
Data for all new vehicles sold in the United States from 2001 to 2013 are obtained from Edmunds.
A rich set of specifications is described within the data including curb weight, transmission-type,
aspiration method, engine specifications, and size measurements. Vehicle dimensions are used to
compute each vehicles footprint for post estimation compliance strategies. The smallest average
footprint, for model year 2013 vehicles, belongs to class 1, sub-compact passenger cars, at 40.2
square feet and the largest belongs to class 10, full-size trucks, at 66.4 square feet.
Several specifications are not used in estimation but are used to provide useful graphical
analysis with regard to vehicle trends. For example, Figure 2.1. provides graphical evidence of the
share of vehicles using available fuel saving technologies. The figure shows some of the
technologies that are captured by the residual technological progress estimates and the increased
use of these technologies by manufacturers. In particular, the figure shows a decline in four or
five speed transmissions and an increase in advanced transmissions technologies such as six speeds
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or more as well as, continuously variable transmissions. Tests on the impact the number of
transmission speeds has on fuel economy, by the EPA, have shown that an additional gear can
improve fuel efficiency by as much as two percent, compared to four speed transmissions.40
Additionally, the figure shows the existence and increased penetration of other new technologies
such as stop-start systems which automatically turn off the vehicle’s engine when the vehicle is
idling. Overall, the figure provides information on how the newer vehicles in this study differ
from those in Knittel (2011) and also provides evidence for the persistent technological progress
estimates found in both studies.
Table 2.2. provides the summary statistics of the data used in analysis. Specifically, the
minimum horsepower for any vehicle is 70 and the maximum is 570.41 The min and max of fuel
economy, for all passenger vehicles used in estimation, is 10.7 and 53.4 mpg, which is in terms of
window sticker mpg. For light-duty trucks, it is 9.35 and 32.65 mpg.42 A total of 21,379
observations are used to estimate the models and observations with missing values are not included
in the estimations.

2.2.2. Methodology
As described by Knittel (2011), the goal of this empirical work is to estimate the technical
relationship between vehicle weight, engine power and fuel economy. The production possibilities
frontier (PPF) illustrates the trade-off between these characteristics. Relative to the base year of
2001, shifts in the PPF represent advances in vehicle technology. These advances have many

40

See https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/tech_transmission.shtml for more details on advanced transmission
technologies.
41
To eliminate extreme values of horsepower and fuel economy, I created a class 11, or 2-door sport, but I do not
estimate this class. Similarly, no electric vehicle observations are included in the estimation models.
42
CAFE compliance is not determined by window sticker fuel economy but by the unadjusted fuel economy level. I
convert average window sticker fuel economy levels, to the approximate CAFE equivalent value during the
compliance strategy section, the conversion process is briefly explained in this section as well.
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forms from engine, transmission, aerodynamic, etc. improvements to the vehicle. Technology
expenditures are omitted from regressions but any potential bias is assumed to small. I use the
estimates to analyze how future vehicles with look if I reduce vehicle attributes and assume various
rates of technological progress. This follows the work of Knittel (2011).43
Overall, I can use estimates to focus on a direct approach to compliance, where I assume
compliance would require manufacturers to improve average class fuel economy to the designated
compliance levels determined by the average class footprint. I consider the physical and structural
options that manufactures have the ability to change, within reason, to increase fuel economy. For
instance, as pointed out by Cheah et. al (2009) vehicle weight, size, and power are major factors
in determining vehicle fuel economy and they believe a relative downsizing may be necessary to
achieve a fuel use reduction. Combining the impact of the vehicle’s curb weight and power with
fuel efficiency improvements attributed to technological progress, I model the changes necessary
to reach standards set for model year 2025 vehicles. Following Cobb-Douglass assumptions the
analysis takes the subsequent functional form and is described below.44
Using a basic linear regression model, I estimate:

(1) ln(mpg it ) = β 0 + β 1ln(curbwt it ) + β 2ln(hp it ) + β 3ln(tor it ) + τ t + µi + βj`Xit + ε it

The dependent variable is the natural log of average window sticker fuel economy, where
subscripts describe individual vehicles in each class for a given year. 45 Vehicle curb weight
(curbwt) is the vehicle’s standing weight in complete operating condition including fluids.

43

For detailed descriptions of the identification strategy please see Knittel (2011).
Translog functional form estimates are included in the appendix.
45
Average fuel economy (mpg) is calculated through a weighted average of city and highway vehicle and year
specific fuel economy i.e.: mpgit = .55 (Citympgit) + .45 (Hwympgit)
44
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Horsepower and torque are (hp) and (tor), respectively. Multiple measures of vehicle power are
included in the regression because horsepower and torque are highly correlated and interpreting
the impact on fuel economy in only one of these variables is challenging.46

(Xit) includes,

transmission type, and engine type. µi represents manufacturer fixed effects.47 The error term is
assumed to be uncorrelated with controls and mean-zero.
Year fixed effects (τ t ) are assumed to capture residual technological progress in improved
fuel efficiency for that year. I am not interested in the impact of specific technologies.48 Instead,
the fixed effects allow for estimates of overall technological growth among the fleet and vehicle
classes, holding measurable vehicle characteristics constant.49
I estimate various versions of equation (1), each including various combinations of
determinants of fuel economy. The results obtained from the model later described as Model 3 is
used to infer compliance strategies and to project fuel economy levels for model year 2025
vehicles. This model allows for the most flexibility in estimating technological progress by
limiting X to include only controls for manual, diesel, and manufacturer fixed effects. The impact
of any of the other specific technologies, which are controlled for in other versions, are assumed
to be absorbed by the year fixed effects.
I use the coefficient results from this model, along with the baseline average class fuel
economy for model year 2013, to project fuel economy improvement over various scenarios for

46

For passenger cars pairwise correlations for horsepower and torque is 0.95 and for light-duty trucks it is 0.91.
I do not make special considerations for vehicle manufacturers that merge companies. All manufacturers are
considered separate across the sample period.
48
For example, one might be interested in the impact of variable valve timing (VVT), a technology that determines
the optimal rate of air flow for the vehicle depending on the engine speed and power needed. The EPA estimates that
VVT has the potential to improve efficiency by 5 percent. Another is cylinder deactivation, which is a technology
that shuts down cylinders once the vehicles has reached a cruising speed and less power is needed to maintain the
vehicles rate of motion.
49
I do allow of some model variations to incorporate popular technologies of interest such as turbo-charged, hybrid,
and super-charged technologies.
47

50

changes in vehicle weight, power, and rates of technological progress. The implied changes to
basic vehicles specifications allow me to see whether manufacturers will be able to comply with
the recently mandated CAFE standards.50

2.3. Results
2.3.1. Passenger Car and Light-Duty Truck
The estimation results for passenger cars and light-duty trucks are summarized in Table 2.3. Model
1 includes vehicle weight, performance and transmission controls, as well as a set of controls for
specific technologies of interest (i.e., diesel fuel, turbocharger, supercharger and hybrid). Model
2 adds manufacturer fixed-effects to Model 1 and Model 3 drops the turbocharger, supercharger,
and hybrid controls in order for these technologies to be absorbed by the year fixed effects,
described earlier as the residual technological progress estimates.51
Analyzing the results for specific technology indicators of Model 2, we can see that both
passenger cars and light-duty trucks benefit from turbochargers, which lead to efficiency gains of
5.4 percent and 6.5 percent respectively. Passenger cars also see fuel improvements of 3.6 percent
from superchargers, whereas, the results for light-duty trucks are inconclusive. Cars and trucks
that utilize hybrid technology see fuel improvements of 29.6 and 28.2 percent.52

50

I cluster vehicle manufacturers for passenger car and light-duty truck models, since modeling errors are assumed
to be correlated within clusters but uncorrelated across clusters (Cameron and Miller 2013). This helps to ensure
that the model is obtaining accurate standard-errors and that t-statistics are not misleadingly large. Class level
estimates are reported with robust standard errors as clustered groups are few and even with bias-correction result
using clusters can lead to over-rejection (Cameron and Miller 2013). For this paper, I do not provide robustness
checks for this model and ask the reader to look towards Knittel (2011) for other estimation methodologies.
51
Model 3 is assumed to provide the best estimate of technological progress, thus this model specification is the
only model estimated at the class level. Results of identifiable characteristic controls that are discussed throughout
the paper come from Model 3. Model 2 is used to highlight the effect of current popular technologies of interest.
52
Hybrids utilize large battery packs which improve fuel economy for several reasons including 1) regenerative
braking capture energy and charge battery, 2) two sources of power allow engine to operate at maximum efficiency,
3) the engine can be shut off at idle. Along with monitoring the use of Hybrid technology the EPA is also following
manufacturer plans to “turbo-downsize” engines. Turbo-downsizing allows for efficiency gains from having smaller

51

Interpreting the results of Model 3, we can discuss the impact identifiable vehicle
characteristics have on fuel economy. For instance, with regard to passenger cars, the results
imply, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent reduction in the vehicles’ curb weight would yield an increase
in fuel economy by 3 percent. Given the average weight for all passenger cars, this would imply a
333 pound reduction in weight. Additionally, a 10 percent increase in horsepower has a negative
impact on fuel economy of 2.93 percent. Passenger cars powered by diesel combustion engines
are 23.4 percent more fuel efficient than those that are not, which is consistent with results found
in Knittel. Furthermore, in comparison with Knittels’ results the gains in fuel economy due to
having a manual transmission have disappeared with modern vehicles.53

This could reflect

technological improvements that have been made to automatic transmissions including the number
of speeds, continuously variable speeds, and new transmissions such as automated manual.
Likewise, Model 3 results for light-duty trucks imply a 10 percent reduction in vehicle curb
weight would improve fuel economy by 3 percent. Vehicle torque becomes highly impactful on
fuel economy, in that a 10 percent increase would decrease fuel economy by nearly 6 percent,
whereas an increase in horsepower would yield fuel savings of 3.2 percent.54 Finally, manual
transmissions reduce fuel economy by 2.6% and diesel powered engines are 48.4 percent more
efficient than gasoline powered engines. The impact of diesel combustion engines is substantially
larger than the results found in Knittel, 24 to 27 percent, and could represent dramatic
improvements in diesel combustion engines thermal efficiency.55 However, the result could suffer

engines but yet still providing and potentially satisfying consumers’ desire for vehicle performance. The EPA is
also currently researching the benefits and impact of Hydraulic Hybrids on the vehicle fleet. This vehicle
specification was not indicated in the data for my analysis. (EPA, Trends Report 2013 pg.53)
53
Knittel finds that manual transmissions improve fuel economy by nearly 5 percent for passenger cars.
54
As pointed out be Knittel (2011), torque and horsepower are highly correlated in that horsepower =
torque*RPM ⁄ 5250.
55
The result is consistent with previous evidence that larger more powerful diesel engines see more efficiency gains
http://www.eia.doe.gov/kids/energyfacts/.
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from having a small sample of diesel trucks, as only 0.005 percent of light-duty trucks in the
sample are diesel engines as opposed to the 0.05 that exist in Knittels’ sample.
With regard to average technological progress estimates, the annual fuel efficiency gains
from residual technological progress average 1.77 and 1.53 percent for passenger cars and lightduty trucks, respectively. These results are nearly identical to those reported in Knittel, which
found average technological progress to be 1.76 and 1.78. The lower average technological
progress for trucks could be because the rate of technological progress slows for light-duty trucks
after 2008. This is likely due to falling gasoline prices in the U.S, which is consistent with previous
literature such as Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002). Specifically, these studies find that the
rate of energy innovation depends on both regulatory standards as well as energy prices.

2.3.2. Class-Level
Estimation results for the 10 vehicle classes, using the Model 3 specification, are summarized in
Table 2.4. From the results, we can see that both Sub-Compact and Mini-van classes of vehicles
have the greatest gains in fuel economy with a reduction in vehicle weight. Specifically, a 10
percent reduction in weight would generate over a 7 percent increase in fuel economy, for both
classes. All other classes range from 2 percent to 5.2 percent improvement in fuel economy with
a 10 percent reduction in weight. Comparing the impact of vehicle horsepower for the 10 classes,
the results indicate that classes 1 through 4 see negative effects; in that, a 10 percent increase would
yield a decrease in fuel economy ranging from 1.6 to 4.7 percent. For classes 5 through 10, also
known as light-duty trucks, the class would either benefit from an increase in horsepower (classes
5,7,9, 10), are inclusive (class 8), or see a loss in fuel economy (class 6). However, as mentioned
earlier horsepower and torque are highly correlated and can have a different impact on fuel
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efficiency depending on the use of the vehicle. Specifically, in classes 6 through 10, which makes
up the majority of the previously described group of light-duty trucks, torque is more highly
correlated with reduced fuel economy.56 Most of the vehicles in these classes have towing
capabilities where power in the form of torque is needed for the vehicle to engage in the initial
stage of work. This also sheds more light on why diesel engines are more efficient as they are
cable of generating more low-end torque at lower rpm’s which generates efficiency. Not all
models at the class level are able to provide insight on desired controls, such as manual
transmission and diesel engines, due to missing data.
Figure 2.2. plots technological progress estimates for each of the 10 classes. Comparing
results of average annual technological progress, we see that class 3 (Mid-size passenger cars),
exhibited the highest at 2.1 percent and class 6 (Large Van) the lowest at half of a percent. 57
Largest technological growth between years range from 3 to 7 percent for all classes, in which 4
of the 10 classes exhibit a period of growth, at some point between 2001 and 2013 model year
vehicles, of 4 percent or greater.

2.3.3. Footprint Based Compliance Strategies
To complete the compliance section of this paper, average class window sticker fuel economy for
model year 2013 vehicles are converted into CAFE-equivalent fuel economy values. In reality,
actual fuel economy of a vehicle is determined largely by how the consumer drives the vehicle.
For example speed, acceleration, braking, weather conditions, and air conditioning use are all
important factors. The EPA considers these factors when determining the sticker MPG. This is

56

This result is consistent with Knittel (2011) and Klier and Linn (2014) in which the latter only includes one
measure of power, horsepower for passenger car and torque for light trucks, in their estimates with fuel consumption
as the dependent variable.
57
Class 6 suffers from a small sample size of 254 observations
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why the sticker MPG is much lower than the CAFE standards. The EPA uses a 5-cycle method
to adjust tested vehicle fuel economy to the window sticker fuel economy, which is the measure
of fuel efficiency consumers see when purchasing a vehicle. This value is also the fuel economy
reported by Edmunds. To determine CAFE compliance by vehicle class, I need unadjusted fuel
economy values. To obtain an approximate conversion factor, I use a conversion file provided by
the EPA to determine that the 54.5 mpg CAFE fleet standard is equal to roughly 39.5 mpg adjusted
fleet fuel economy (i.e., window sticker fuel economy), which is approximately a 38 percent
difference. The conversion varies for specific vehicles at high and low levels of fuel economy.
However after comparing several vehicle models in different classes and for simplicity, I assume
the adjusted fuel economy to CAFE equivalent is approximately a 34 percent increase. I use this
value to adjust vehicle fuel economy throughout the remainder of the paper in order to discuss
compliance and results.
The second phase (2017 to 2025) of the EPA designed CAFE program allows for several
flexibilities, in which manufacturers can use to comply with standards. Flexibilities include
building credits from A/C (air conditioning) improvements that lower CO 2 emissions and credits
for implementing off-cycle technologies, such as solar panels, hybrids, and engine stop start.
Additionally, manufacturers will be allowed to bank and trade these credits, which the EPA hopes
will ease the transition into the stringent phase two standards. There are also incentives built into
the program that encourage manufacturers to incorporate advanced technologies and more electric
(EV), Plug in hybrid electric (PHEV), fuel-cell (FCV), and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles
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into production, which will act as a multiplier towards compliance.58 All of the described program
flexibilities are designed to lower the burden of compliance.59
As stated earlier however, the goal of this paper was not to present all possible ways vehicle
manufacturers could comply with the more stringent CAFE standards but instead is to showcase
the challenges manufacturers will face if they attempt to comply using a direct approach of
changing only identifiable vehicle characteristics. Thus, I do not attempt to model the CAFE
programs flexibilities but reiterate that manufacturers must experience significant technological
growth, take advantage of program flexibilities, or lower the burden of compliance through vehicle
footprint size in order to reach compliance. This is why program provisions were created by the
EPA, so that manufacturers would have time to make the technological improvements required to
reach the final stage fuel economies set for year 2025. However, as pointed on this paper
alternatively manufacturers may choose to increase vehicle sizes instead of pursuing technological
advances thus undermining the goals of the program. In order to pursue the previously describe
direct approach method of compliance, Table 2.5. summarizes the vehicle characteristics for all
classes in year 2013, including average adjusted fuel economy, the CAFE- equivalent value, curb
weight, horsepower, torque and calculated average class footprint. Table 2.6., labeled class
compliance and footprint increase incentive, illustrates each classes 2025 model year projected
compliance target with the predicted fuel economy of the class.60

58
It is important to note that manufacturer compliance is also determined by production levels of each vehicle and
not just model or class level fuel economy. Thus, fleet fuel economy is calculated using a harmonic mean. For this
paper, neither sales nor production data were available.
59
For more information on program flexibilities see http://www3.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f12051.pdf.
60
Compliance targets are determined by the average class footprint in this paper. See
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf for information regarding vehicle footprint size and CAFE
compliance levels.
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Predicted CAFE fuel economy(s) are generated by adjusting 2013 average mpg for each
class by the Model 3 results for weight, power, and technological progress.61 I assume three rates
of technological progress: average progress, 75th percentile, and maximum estimated progress.62
Additionally, I consider weight reductions of 10 and 20 percent. The weight reductions are
reasonable when considering the possible introduction of high-strength aluminum steel frames.
Ford has already introduced this technology with their 2015 model year F-150’s, which weigh as
much as 700 lbs. less than previous models (Ford Manufacturer website). This 700 lb. reduction
is approximately 14 percent of the class 10, full-size truck average curb weight. Additionally, the
weight changes are consistent with history for plausible reductions as weight has increased 6.5 and
17.5 percent for cars and trucks respectively, over the 2001 to 2013 time period. In comparison to
the Knittel’s (2011) study and the 1980 average weight, values have increased 11 and 20 percent.
Finally, to incorporate a possible change to performance characteristics, a 10 and 20 percent
increase or decrease to each vehicle class most influential power measure was also factored into
possible compliance strategies.63 Again, these are reasonable adjustments given that the average
passenger car in 2013 has about 27 percent more horsepower and the average light-duty truck has
27 percent more torque, than the vehicle models available in 2001.
From the projection results, it is apparent that manufacturers will have a difficult time
complying with the standards set for model year 2025 vehicles through changing vehicle
characteristics alone. This result is conducive with those found by Bastani et al. (2012), in that,
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I change the power measure that is most highly correlate with fuel consumption in each class. Thus, classes 1-4, 6
have implied reductions in horsepower, class’s 7-10 reductions in torque, and class 5 in class 5 horsepower is
increased. It is important to briefly reiterate that class 5 and 6 have small sample sizes and are likely not precisely
estimated.
62
Technological progress rates come from the difference of technological progress estimates that can be seen in
Table 2.5. Ranking the rates from smallest to largest allows me to identify the 75th percentile and maximum
estimated growth rate.
63
See footnote 23.
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they find the likelihood of combined compliance of passenger cars and light-duty trucks meeting
or exceeding the 2025 standards is less than 1 percent. In fact my results indicate, only two classes
of vehicles, compact SUV and Minivans, were able to reach the compliance level without
substantial technological progress in fuel economy, i.e.: maximum estimated technological
progress. All vehicle classes were able to comply when vehicle weight was decreased by 10 or 20
percent, power was changed by 10 percent and fuel improvements attributed to technological
progress was assumed to continue at each classes estimated maximum.64 This also illustrates how
important continued application of existing technologies and technological progress will be in
maintaining a vehicle fleet that is similar to those consumers have grown accustom too. As pointed
out by Klier and Linn (2011), consumers value an increase in power more than a proportional
increase in fuel economy. Thus, drastic changes to vehicle characteristics, due to manufacturers’
attempts to comply with CAFE standards, may impact demand in the market for new vehicles.
Considering these results, it would be practical for manufacturers to take advantage of the
CAFE programs flexibilities and incentives, including, obtaining credits through either emission
reducing technologies or from trading with other manufacturers. Increasing production and sales
of EV, PHEV, CNG, and FCV vehicles would also help since these vehicles would count as more
than one vehicle in the manufacturers’ compliance calculation for 2017 to 2021 model year
vehicles. From the Model 2 estimation results, we also know that the increase in fuel efficiency
from hybrid technology is 30 percent and 28 percent for passenger cars and light-duty trucks.
Turbo-downsizing is another avenue manufacturers may wish to pursue since prior research
indicates vehicle power is a significant factor in consumer vehicle choice. Estimates also show
that the existence of turbochargers improves fuel efficiency by 5.4 and 6.5 percent for passenger

64

Maximum technological progress estimates range from 3 to 7.3 percent for the various classes of vehicles.
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cars and light-duty trucks, thus improving fuel economy but still keeping the power consumers
desire.
Further investigation shows that manufacturers may also have an incentive to increase the
size (“footprint”) of their vehicles in order to fall to a lower required CAFE compliance standard.
Previous research by Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) supports the idea that footprint-based CAFE
standards do create incentives to increase vehicle size, dependent on assumptions made about
consumer preferences. Table 2.6. also represents the increased attainability of compliance from
an increase of 10 percent to average class footprint. On average this 10 percent change results in
a 4.6 sq. ft. increase in the vehicles footprint. This is a relatively small change in the vehicles size
and for most classes this value could be obtained with an increase in the track-width and wheelbase
by four inches or less. Additionally, this increase in size is still modest compared to the estimated
results in Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) which suggest that the incentive to increase vehicle size is
5.7 and 9.9 sq. ft. for passenger cars and light-duty trucks, respectively.
Highlighted values in the table indicate acceptable compliance levels of fuel economy. The
results illustrate that after average class footprint is increased, eight out of the ten classes no longer
require maximum technological progress in order to reach compliance. Three of those eight only
require average technological progress to comply with standards. Additionally, if technological
progress is assumed to continue at the 75th percentile, 4 classes meet compliance standards with
only a 10 percent weight reduction, along with a 10 percent change to power. Even more
interesting is that the 10 percent increase in footprint allows six out of ten classes to comply
without any change to power measures at all. This is a desirable option given that Whitefoot and
Skerlos (2012) find that consumers are willing to pay $160-$5500 more from an additional 0.1
hp/lb in acceleration performance. Given prior results presented about the difficulty manufacturers
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will face when attempting to comply with the stringent CAFE standards. It is clear from the results,
that increasing the footprint of their vehicles in production will make them less dependent on
technological progress and require smaller changes to the existing characteristics of the fleet.65

2.4. Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of identifiable vehicle characteristics have on fuel economy, as
well as estimating technological advances that have occurred over the model year 2001 to 2013
vehicle fleet. Estimates were used with average footprint calculations, for each vehicle class, to
discuss possible compliance strategies for the CAFE standards set for 2025 model year vehicles.
The results suggest that a difficult road is ahead for manufacturers who attempt to comply
with standards by changing identifiable vehicle characteristics, such as curb weight and power
alone. It is also evident that significant technological progress will be needed to improve fuel
economy to the compliance levels. This plays into the flexible incentive based design of the
program and encourages manufacturers to improve and use existing fuel technologies to earn
credits and multipliers that could be used in final compliance calculations. However, under the
current CAFE policy the burden of compliance may also incentivize manufacturers to increase
vehicle size in order to fall to a lower footprint based compliance level. This issue of incentivizing
alternative means of compliance may not have been considered as a potential problem by those in
charge of designing the new CAFE standards. The potential incentive to increase vehicle size to
attain compliance is counterproductive to the fuel improvements CAFE standards are designed to
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The increase in vehicle size may also require unwanted changes to vehicle weight, which lowers fuel efficiency,
but this could be countered by the use of lighter high-strength aluminum frames.
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generate among the fleet. It also creates vehicle safety concerns when considering the possibility
of an increasing gap between the size of small and large vehicle classes.
Continued research on the impact of the stringent standards, on vehicle safety, fuel
efficiency, the market for new vehicles, environmental issues, and vehicle insurance will be crucial
for policy analysis of the current footprint based CAFE standards. This paper adds to the prior
literature and continued research on CAFE policy and highlights the difficulties manufacturers
will face as they set out to comply with the footprint based 2025 model year vehicle standards.
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Figure 2.1. Penetration of Fuel Improving Technologies
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Figure 2.2. Technological Progress by Vehicle Class
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Table 2.1. Vehicle Classes

Vehicle Type

Passenger Cars

Light-Duty Trucks

Vehicle Classes
Description
Class 1: Wheelbase under
100 in.
Class 2: Wheelbase 100104 in
Class 3: Wheelbase 105109 in
Class 4: Wheelbase > 109
in.
Class 5: Unibody
Class 6: Frame Based
Class 7: FARS
classification
Class 8: FARS
classification
Class 9: Under 4500 lbs
Class 10: Over 4500 lbs
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Name
Subcompact

Example
Toyota “Yaris”

Compact

Honda “Civic”

Midsize

Chevy “Malibu”

Full-Size
Minivans
Large Van
Compact SUV

Volkswagen
“Passat”
Dodge “Caravan”
GMC “Savana”
Ford “Escape”

Large SUV

Acura “MDX”

Compact Truck
Full-Size Truck

Chevy “Colorado”
Ram “1500”

Table 2.2. Summary Statistics Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks
Passenger Cars
Variable
Fuel Economy
Curb Weight
Horsepower
Torque
Diesel
Manual
Supercharged
Turbocharged
Hybrid
Sample Size
Variable
Fuel Economy
Curb Weight
Horsepower
Torque
Diesel
Manual
Supercharged
Turbocharged
Hybrid
Sample Size

Mean

SD

Min

Max

2001 Mean

23.68
3329.42
217.64
215.16
0.019
0.381
0.021
0.171
0.020
10,851

5.12
582.43
95.62
92.75
0.138
0.486
0.142
0.377
0.140

10.70
1808
70
68
0
0
0
0
0

53.40
6814
570
774
1
1
1
1
1

22.85
3157.49
180.78
188.80
0.016
0.405
0.018
0.105
0.006
669

Mean
17.80
4438.89
245.91
266.72
0.005
0.181
0.009
0.026
0.015
10,528

Light-Duty Trucks
SD
Min
Max
2.96
775.07
66.38
73.41
0.067
0.385
0.094
0.159
0.123

9.35
2624
97
103
0
0
0
0
0
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32.65
7154
555
575
1
1
1
1
1

2001 Mean
17.28
3932.62
191.16
222.50
0.005
0.355
0.015
0.005
Omitted
592

2013
Mean
26.65
3363.54
230.48
225.63
.040
0.320
0.025
0.319
0.056
1186
2013
Mean
19.56
4619.94
274.94
282.59
0.012
0.063
0.009
0.091
0.028
759

Table 2.3. Estimates of Passenger Cars and Light-Duty Trucks
Passenger Cars

ln(curbwt)
ln(hp)
ln(torque)
Manual
Diesel
Turbo
Super
Hybrid
Year Fixed-Effects
Manufacturer
Fixed-Effects
Observations
Adjusted R2
Average Annual
Technological
Progress
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Light-Duty Trucks

Model 1
-0.254***
(0.070)
-0.250***
(0.092)
-0.102
(0.092)
-0.006
(0.006)
0.221***
(0.049)
0.042***
(0.013)
0.054**
(0.027)
0.328***
(0.037)
Yes

Model 2
-0.300***
(0.042)
-0.220***
(0.067)
-0.088
(0.061)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.240***
(0.033)
0.054***
(0.014)
0.036*
(0.020)
0.296***
(0.039
Yes

Model 3
-0.299***
(0.065)
-0.293**
(0.130)
-0.024
(0.147)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.234***
(0.069)

Model 2
-0.328***
(0.040)
0.290***
(0.042)
-0.545***
(0.044)
-0.025***
(0.007)
0.429***
(0.030)
0.065***
(0.018)
-0.031
(0.033)
0.282***
(0.282)
Yes

Model 3
-0.297***
(0.046)
0.312***
(0.073)
-0.581***
(0.073)
-0.026***
(0.007)
0.484***
(0.049)

Yes

Model 1
-0.314***
(0.037)
0.281***
(0.039)
-0.541***
(0.042)
-0.026***
(0.007)
0.413***
(0.029)
0.060***
(0.012)
-0.051**
(0.023)
0.288***
(0.022)
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

10851
0.850

10851
0.902

10851
0.860

10528
0.815

10528
0.828

10528
0.779

Passenger Cars

Light-Duty Trucks

0.007
0.019
0.027
0.034
0.054
0.072
0.085
0.104
0.132
0.155
0.182
0.202

-0.003
0.016
0.032
0.044
0.056
0.074
0.085
0.109
0.129
0.141
0.152
0.165

Yes

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the manufacturer level. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Individual model technological progress estimates are significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level.
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0.013*
0.016**
0.010

0.008
0.019**
0.030***

0.014**
0.037***
0.053***

-0.005
0.022**
0.029***

-0.013
0.009
0.019**

0.000
0.017
0.090***

0.003
0.030***
0.048***

0.011
0.046***
0.070***

2005
0.003 0.040*** 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.091***
2006
0.023*** 0.054*** 0.097*** 0.041*** 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.094***
2007
0.045*** 0.078*** 0.116*** 0.057*** 0.039*** 0.124*** 0.110*** 0.144***
2008
0.068*** 0.105*** 0.121*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.118*** 0.175***
2009
0.083*** 0.124*** 0.136*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.097*** 0.142*** 0.204***
2010
0.110*** 0.143*** 0.172*** 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.115*** 0.168*** 0.236***
2011
0.140*** 0.159*** 0.189*** 0.158*** 0.110*** 0.060*** 0.195*** 0.242***
2012
0.148*** 0.191*** 0.215*** 0.190*** 0.122*** 0.060*** 0.209*** 0.248***
2013
0.160*** 0.210*** 0.254*** 0.226*** 0.121*** 0.060*** 0.226*** 0.255***
Year FixedYes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Effects
Manufacturer
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Fixed-Effects
Observations
1635
2512
3976
2747
738
254
3661
1463
Adjusted R2
0.891
0.887
0.838
0.861
0.738
0.613
0.833
0.703
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reported results are from robust standard errors which are omitted for brevity.

ln(curbwt)
ln(hp)
ln(torque)
Manual
Diesel
Technological
Progress
Estimates
2002
2003
2004

0.040***
0.049***
0.063***
0.078***
0.109***
0.126***
0.137***
0.144***
0.147***
Yes
Yes
2759
0.468

Yes
Yes
1653
0.804

-0.000
0.010
0.026***
0.039***
0.045***
0.060***
0.070***
0.090***
0.094***
0.092***
0.101***
0.145***

-0.001
-0.004
0.013**

Model 3 Estimates by Vehicle Class
SubMiniLarge
Compact
Large
Compact Standard
Compact Mid-size Full-size
Compact
vans
Van
SUV
SUV
Truck
Truck
-0.739*** -0.287*** -0.410*** -0.456*** -0.713*** -0.334*** -0.362*** -0.523*** -0.356*** -0.202***
-0.471*** -0.383*** -0.272*** -0.157*** 0.259*** -0.207*** 0.315***
-0.009
0.521*** 0.138***
0.325***
0.040*
-0.066*** -0.160*** -0.247***
0.033
-0.611*** -0.189*** -0.836*** -0.276***
0.011***
0.003
-0.017*** -0.030***
0.021
-0.025*** -0.104*** 0.012*** 0.015***
0.194*** 0.182*** 0.215*** 0.241***
0.486*** 0.294***

Table 2.4. Model 3 Estimates by Vehicle Class
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Summary Statistics by Vehicle Class
SubCompact
Large
Compact
Class Compact
Compact
Mid-Size Full-Size Mini-Van Large Van SUV
SUV
Truck
Variable
Fuel
Economy
28.93
28.14
27.89
23.455
22.048
14.2
22.353
17.78
18.894
CAFE MPG
38.77
37.71
37.37
31.42
29.54
19.03
29.95
23.83
25.32
Curb Weight
2799.52
3038.31
3258.49
3935.17
4157.87
5694.38
3949.05
5314.54
4134.15
Horsepower
152.63
196.94
208.17
309.01
228.11
265.31
236.45
327.85
226.32
Torque
155.63
192.72
204.22
299.4
216.17
308.75
228.06
346.86
245.98
Footprint
40.2
42.59
44.84
49.76
53.02
65.71
47.51
55.05
54.96

Table 2.5. Summary Statistics by Vehicle Class

16.71
22.39
5216.41
322.32
342.51
66.37

Full-Size
Truck

71
45.42
48.78
52.14
53.62
57.31
51.08
54.60
57.04
56.14
60.01
62.70
61.88
66.14
69.10

Average Tech. Progress
10% weight & Avg. Tech.
20% weight & Avg. Tech.
10% & 75% tile
20% & 75% tile
10% weight, power, Avg. Tech
20%,10%, Avg. Tech
20, 20, Avg. Tech
10, 10, 75% tile
20, 10, 75% tile
20, 20, 75% tile
10, 10, Max
20, 10, Max
20, 20, Max

2

46.41
47.75
49.08
48.7
50.06
49.58
50.96
52.86
50.57
51.98
53.92
58.41
60.04
62.28

46.85

2

58.43

46.41
47.75
49.08
48.7
50.06
49.58
50.96
52.86
50.57
51.98
53.92
58.41
60.04
62.28

42.59

3

48.03
49.73
51.43
51.88
53.65
51.08
52.83
54.20
53.29
55.11
56.55
62.98
65.12
66.82

49.32

3

56.01

48.03
49.73
51.43
51.88
53.65
51.08
52.83
54.20
53.29
55.11
56.55
62.98
65.12
66.82

44.84

4

39.31
41.09
42.87
44.75
46.73
41.73
43.54
44.20
45.49
47.46
48.18
54.94
57.33
58.19

54.74

4

50.75

39.31
41.09
42.87
44.75
46.73
41.73
43.54
44.20
45.49
47.46
48.18
54.94
57.33
58.19

49.76

5

33.34
35.71
38.09
39.58
42.22
36.64
39.08
40.07
40.61
43.31
44.41
47.08
50.21
51.49

58.32

5

40.5

33.34
35.71
38.09
39.58
42.22
36.64
39.08
40.07
40.61
43.31
44.41
47.08
50.21
51.49

53.02

6

20.21
20.88
21.56
24.52
25.31
21.32
22.00
22.44
25.03
25.84
26.35
47.02
48.54
49.50

72.28

6

33.4

20.21
20.88
21.56
24.52
25.31
21.32
22.00
22.44
25.03
25.84
26.35
47.02
48.54
49.50

65.71

7

37.5
38.84
40.2
41.88
43.35
41.21
42.65
40.68
44.44
44.71
43.87
48.30
48.59
47.68

52.26

7

44.1

37.5
38.84
40.2
41.88
43.35
41.21
42.65
40.68
44.44
44.71
43.87
48.30
48.59
47.68

47.51

8

30.66
32.26
33.86
36.46
38.27
32.87
34.51
35.15
37.15
38.31
39.73
45.64
47.06
48.80

60.56

8

39.2

30.66
32.26
33.86
36.46
38.27
32.87
34.51
35.15
37.15
38.31
39.73
45.64
47.06
48.80

55.05

9

29.23
30.27
31.31
32.01
33.11
32.81
33.94
36.54
34.70
34.84
38.64
47.57
47.76
52.97

60.46

9

39.2

29.23
30.27
31.31
32.01
33.11
32.81
33.94
36.54
34.70
34.84
38.64
47.57
47.76
52.97

54.96

25.91
26.43
26.95
27.13
27.66
27.17
27.70
28.43
27.89
28.04
29.18
33.94
34.13
35.52

73.01

10

33.4

25.91
26.43
26.95
27.13
27.66
27.17
27.70
28.43
27.89
28.04
29.18
33.94
34.13
35.52

66.37

10

Compliance Fuel Economy (2025)
57.19
53.78
51.72
46.39
37.5
30.9
41.2
35.8
35.8
30.6
Notes: Left-hand descriptions are as follows: When numbers are listed, first number represent change to vehicle weight, second number represents change to
power. Final description represents assumptions made about technological progress, except row (1) where no characteristic changes are made to the vehicles in
each class. Non-bold numbers within the tables are 2025 projected fuel economy values. The compliance level is shown for the various footprint size classes in
the last row of each table. Specifically, the last row of the lower table shows compliance levels if manufacturers increased the footprint size of each class by 10
percent. Shaded Values indicated compliance to CAFE standards.

44.22

10% increase in Footprint

1

61.07

Compliance Fuel Economy (2025)

Vehicle Class

45.42
48.78
52.14
53.62
57.31
51.08
54.60
57.04
56.14
60.01
62.70
61.88
66.14
69.10

40.2

1

Average Tech. Progress
10% weight & Avg. Tech.
20% weight & Avg. Tech.
10% & 75% tile
20% & 75% tile
10% weight, power, Avg. Tech
20%,10%, Avg. Tech
20, 20, Avg. Tech
10, 10, 75% tile
20, 10, 75% tile
20, 20, 75% tile
10, 10, Max
20, 10, Max
20, 20, Max

Average FT (Square Feet)

Vehicle Class

Table 2.6. Class Compliance and Footprint Increase Incentive

Chapter 3: The Effect of Medical Marijuana on Sickness
3.1. Introduction
The merits of legalizing marijuana for medical purposes are touted by interest groups like
High Times, MedicalMarijuanaprocon.org, and the Marijuana Policy Project.66 Claims of the
medical benefits of marijuana are hardly unfounded. The Institute of Medicine posit that nausea,
appetite loss, pain, and anxiety are all afflictions that can be mitigated by marijuana (Joy et al.
1999). Economists have recently begun examining the effects of medical marijuana legalization
(MML) from a variety of policy relevant angles, including traffic fatalities (Anderson et al.
2013), suicide rates (Anderson et al. 2014), and even seat belt use (Adams et al. 2014). Although
there has been some work on the labor market impact of illicit marijuana use, the same is not true
of the effect of MML.67
To fill this void, I analyze work absences after MML. If individuals experience relief from
disabling symptoms, absence from work could decline. For example, migraines result in an
estimated annual 270 lost work days for every 1000 persons (Rasmussen 1992). Alternatively,
medical marijuana is likely a better means to self-medicate a variety of symptoms instead of
alcohol. Anderson et al. (2013) found that alcohol consumption declined after MML, and
Marmot et al. (1993) found that heavy drinkers are more often absent from work. Green et al.
(2015) found that extending bar hours increased work absence. There is also the possibility that
MML could lead to an increase in work absences. This suggests a complementary relationship

66
Cost and benefit debates, links below are those referred to above.
http://www.hightimes.com/read/new-study-cannabis-may-help-cure-cancer
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=1325
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/Effective-Arguments-for-Medical-Marijuana.pdf
67
See Ours and Williams (2014) for a thorough review.
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between alcohol and marijuana. Previous research supporting complementarity is described in
Anderson et al. (2014).
Currently, 24 states allow people to use marijuana for medical purposes. My results show
that absences due to sickness have decline after enactment of MML, and the effect is
concentrated on worker groups more expected to hold cards. Overall, this paper advances the
literature on MML by providing insight on the effect these laws have on the labor market, while
also providing unique evidence that may encourage others to pursue research on this relatively
untapped topic.

3.2. Data and Methods
The data were obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), March
Current Population Survey (CPS), which contain self-reported work absence data from the
individuals’ week of work prior to the survey. I construct an indicator of absence from work due
to illness/medical issues as well as demographic indicators for, gender, age cohorts, race, marital
status, and education level. I then link absence data to state-level legislation on medical
marijuana. States that legalized medical marijuana from 1992-2012 are treatment states
(indicated by the MML dummy). All MML state data on effective dates, were obtained from
MedicalMarijuana.procon.org. A table of this detailed information was omitted for brevity of the
paper but will be released to readers upon request.
The estimation method follows a linear probability model (LPM), which tests for effects
at the individual-level, as well as effects on subgroups most likely affected by MML.68 Although

68 For robustness, I also estimate a Poisson count model, which tests for overall declines in the number of individuals reporting
absence due to illness/medical issues at the state-level. The results found an 8 percent and 11 percent reduction for the full
sample and full-time workers, respectively. Results are significant at the 5 and 1 percent level.
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there are limitations of the LPM, it provides estimates with easily interpretable coefficients and
avoids the incidental parameters problem.
The basic analysis takes the following form:
(1) SAist = α + ηs + τt + µst + βMMLst + λ'Xist + εist,
where subscripts i, s and t denote individual, state and year. SA is a dichotomous variable
indicating that the individual reported being absent from work due to illness, injury, or medical
issues.69 MML is an indicator variable that captures whether the state allowed individuals to use
marijuana for medical purposes. Thus, β is our primary coefficient of interest in both models.70
In some specifications, I indicate states with “lax” MML (i.e. large number of card-holders, ease
of access to marijuana, and large potential spillovers) and “strict” MML (i.e. small number of
card holders and tougher supply-side restrictions). Specially, “lax” states include California,
Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington whereas, “strict” states include Alaska, Delaware,
Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.71 One would expect a stronger result in “lax”
versus “strict” states.72
Additionally, dummies for gender and age cohorts are interacted with the policy variable
to identify an effect specific to that group. This isolates the effect of MML on the group of
individuals most likely to hold licenses. The group that reports the heaviest use of marijuana for
medicinal purposes are ages 25-44 (Nunberg et al. 2013). Additionally, Reiman (2007) found in
a sample of cardholders, an average age of 39.9. In Colorado, it is 42.73 Additionally, all

69

The CPS is self-reported data. Given this element, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of classical
measurement error which could impact the interpretation of the estimates in this paper. However, the CPS is
commonly used in studies to represent the US labor force.
70
Lead policy variables are insignificant.
71
See http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=005889 for cardholder numbers.
72
Other treated states are dropped from regression.
73
See https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CHED_MMJ_07_2014_%20MMR_report.pdf for
statistics
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sources report that the proportion of applicants and card-holders who are male is approximately
70%. The terms ηs and τt are the state and time fixed effects, which capture differences in
sickness absence across states and differences unique to every time period in the sample. The
state-time trend is the linear time trend “τ” interacted with individual states “η”, that is “τ*η”,
indicated above as µst. The X vector includes controls for gender, age, race, marital status and
education.
Self-employed individuals are dropped because the meaning of absence from work is less
clear (Lechmann et al. 2013). Individuals who reported absence from work for reasons that are
not health related were dropped. However, the inclusion of either groups do not substantively
change the results. I also limit the sample to full-time employees because of their greater
attachment to the labor market and value placed on the job (Bulow and Summers 1986). Thus,
full-time employees may be more motivated to pursue options that allow them to return to work
sooner and as a result we would expect to see a stronger effect from MML.

3.3. Results
The LPM estimate results for the full sample are presented in columns (1)-(4). In column (1)
the estimate is negative, significant at the 10 percent level and suggests that relative to the mean
of the sample, respondents were 8 percent less likely to report being absent from work due to
health issues after MML. Column (2), presents results for “lax” and “strict” MML states and
show “lax” states sickness absence decreased by 13 percent, relative to the mean and is
significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, to isolate the groups that are most likely to use
medical marijuana for health issues, columns (3) and (4) report results with policy dummy
interactions. Relative to the mean sickness absence of the isolated group, men are nearly 9
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percent and individuals ages 30-39 and 40-49 are 15 and 11 percent less likely to report sickness
absence after MML. These results are significant at the 5, 1, and 5 percent level.
Results for full-time workers can be seen in columns (5)-(7). Specifically, age groups 3039, 40-49, and 50-59 are 16, 11, and 13 percent less likely report absences due to illness/medical
issues after MML. These results are significant at the 1, 10, and 1 percent level, respectively.

3.4. Conclusion
Dunn and Youngblood (1986) estimate that costs of absenteeism in the U.S. are around 24
billion dollars a year. Coles et al. (2007) estimate that the wage offset of a 1 percent increase in
the absence rate is 56 cents. The results of this paper therefore suggest that MML would
decrease costs for employers as it has reduced self-reported absence from work due to
illness/medical issues. Although there is not a direct identification of those who use marijuana
for medical purposes in the data, overall sickness absence is reduced for those in age and gender
groups most likely to be cardholders.
With momentum in the favor of legalized medical marijuana, it will be important to
understand how this legislation will impact the labor market. Given the lack of prior studies,
more research is warranted in this area.
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-.0013*
(.0007)

(3)
LPM

-.0020**
(.0010)
-.0007
(.0018)
-.0017**
(.0008)
-.0011
(.0008)

Full Sample

(2)
LPM

(4)
LPM

.0143

.0174

.0185

.0140

.0155

Mean
Sickness
LPM Groups
(6)
LPM

-.0091*
(.0048)
-.0018
(.0054)

Full-Time Workers
-.0067**
(.0033)

(5)
LPM

(7)
LPM

.0795

.0683

.0770

Mean
Sickness
LPM Groups

.0007
.0023
.0008
.0065
(.0007)
(.0053)
20-29*MML
-.0010
.0126
-.0021
.0337
(.0010)
(.0050)
30-39*MML
-.0038***
.0244
-.0140***
.0853
(.0008)
(.0033)
40-49*MML
-.0034**
.0316
-.0135*
.1253
(.0016)
(.0074)
50-59*MML
-.0016
.0250
-.0165***
.1300
(.0012)
(.0060)
60-65*MML
.0005
.0104
.0014
.0783
(.0010)
(.0044)
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State, Time F.E.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State-Time Trend
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
757,677 697,476
757,677
757,677
121,710
111,829
121,710
Notes: Each column indicates an individual regression. All models include controls for race, marital status, age cohort, and educational
attainment. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. All estimates are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Mean sickness
levels are included to interpret coefficient results. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10.

15-19*MML

Female*MML

Male*MML

Strict*MML

Lax*MML

Policy Variable:
MML

(1)
LPM

Table 3.1. Effect of MML on Sickness Absence
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